UNCOMMON SENSE, UNCOMMON COURAGE:
HOW THE NEW YORK CITY SCHOOL SYSTEM, ITS TEACHERS, LEADERSHIP,
AND STUDENTS RESPONDED TO THE TERROR OF SEPTEMBER 11

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AND STUDENTS RESPONDED TO THE TERROR OF SEPTEMBER 11

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In 1954, General Chidlaw spoke these words as our country began to take steps to prepare for what was then called “a new reality”—the possibility of a nuclear attack. As Americans prepared for this new reality, fallout shelters were constructed in public housing areas, movie theaters and in business locations. Schoolchildren and school administrators everywhere were forced to become familiar with drills designed to protect them from the fallout of a nuclear disaster. On numerous occasions throughout the school year, children huddled together under desks and tables in classrooms and stood in tight formation in hallways, while being ever mindful to face away from windows and glass panes from classroom doors. Experience now shows us that while these steps appeared to be practical in nature, in fact they would have done very little to prevent serious injury or death from the residual effects of a nuclear weapon. These steps did however have value in a subtle, perhaps unintended way: they created a new culture of preparedness in our nation’s schools.

The events of September 11, 2001 also thrust our nation into a new reality. No longer did we have to fear devastating attacks from an enemy that maintained its foothold abroad. This new reality showed us that the enemy resides within our shores and will use unconventional means to upset our way of life. The events of September 11, 2001 also showed education officials in New York City and across the country that schools do not have to be the intended target of a terrorist attack in order to suffer long lasting damage. In the case of the schools in the immediate vicinity of the former World Trade Center complex, many suffered structural damage and also lost the use of schoolbooks and other instructional material because of the exposure to falling debris or airborne contaminants. Moreover, schools outside the immediate grid of this disaster were affected as well. Because of transit or traffic delays or cancellations, some students were forced to wait in schools for hours into the night until parents or authorized caretakers came to pick them up. Further, the attacks on the Pentagon had a direct effect on children in the greater Washington D.C. area, because a number
of students on a school trip were on the fateful flight that was crashed into the Pentagon.

As the former Executive Director of Student Safety and senior law enforcement/security official for the New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE), I worked closely with officials from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the United States Department of Education and a number of other city, state and federal law enforcement agencies to address security and disaster related issues that arose for the many schools in the lower Manhattan area that were affected by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Because of my work in this regard, I have been asked to share what I have called “the untold story,” the story of how my colleagues at the NYCDOE, in partnership with the New York City Police Department School Safety Division, were successful in evacuating over nine thousand students and staff from eight schools that were in close proximity to the former World Trade Center. While this was no easy feat, we were successful in reuniting the over one million students across the city with their loved ones, without one child or staff member being hurt, lost or killed.

I have shared this story with large numbers of school safety officials at the national and international level as well as with police chiefs, parents, school administrators and homeland security/emergency management experts. Every audience was in awe of the accomplishments of this day and of the days and weeks afterwards. In my mind, this act and the countless ones that followed to keep the “educational ship afloat” are essential parts of a story that must be told to ensure that schools and the communities that surround them are prepared to respond and recover from a catastrophic disaster or act of terrorism. What follows is that story - full of lessons learned- lessons that will serve any school district well as they deal with a disaster, large or small.

An all embracing thank you goes out to Dr. Nancy Degnan and her graduate students for taking the steps to chronicle this story through painstaking interviews and note taking. Lastly, a huge salute goes out to my former colleagues at the NYCDOE, especially to the principals, administrators, teachers, paraprofessionals, school aides, custodians, cafeteria professionals and any other person(s) or employee(s) that I through oversight failed to name, who put their lives and emotions in harm’s way to save or shield a child from the dangers of that day. No employment contract that was signed or job description that was drafted called for these acts of heroism; but when duty called, they all answered the bell!
I would like to close with a quote attributed to a nameless teacher who was working at P.S. 234, located four short blocks from the World Trade Center. On this fateful day, which should be noted was the *fourth* day of school for our school system; this teacher is quoted by Ms. Anna Switzer, the then principal of P.S. 234 as saying ....” I learned an important lesson on that day...that I could only run as fast as my slowest child.”

Gregory A. Thomas, MS  
Director, The Program for School Preparedness and Planning  
National Center for Disaster Preparedness  
Mailman School of Public Health  
Columbia University
INTRODUCTION

Eight public schools are situated within a quarter mile of Ground Zero with 9,000 students ranging in ages from three to eighteen years - grammar, middle and high schools. On Tuesday, September 11, 2001 in the midst of chaos and a relentless unfolding of tragedy, professionals of the Board of Education safely evacuated all 9,000 students without injury. They also ensured that all 1.1 million school children, in every part of the city got home safely, reunited with family and loved ones. They did this as transportation around the City was halted, subways, roads, bridges were closed, and airspace over the United States was shutdown except to military flights.

This report is the articulation of a truly effective reaction by a complex organization. Some would label it as luck or extraordinary good fortune. In fact, when all the evidence is finally in, this report argues that the Board of Education’s handling of the crisis presented by 9/11, comprised its “shining moment” - where leadership and courage were manifest and where the paramount objective “get our kids home safe” made the difference between life and death.

Early in October 2001, the Board of Education contacted me to document what the Board of Education did in response to the World Trade Center attack. Capturing how and how well BOE personnel responded would be an important contribution to the knowledge base - and would, ultimately, provide a testament to the courage and actions of those involved.

I taught a course each spring at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs entitled the Workshop in Applied Policy Analysis. The objective of the course was to enable advanced graduate students of public administration to research issues of importance to a nonprofit or government client. The New York City Board of Education became the Workshop client for that semester. Over a ten-week period, the Workshop Team would help to define the contours of the 9/11 issues, research them through primary and secondary data gathering and assemble recommendations from the interviews.

I began with interviews in the fall of 2001 to tap peoples’ memories of 9/11 as close to the events as possible. The project moved forward through February 2002 and was completed by the end of May 2002, as the Workshop Team also conducted interviews and reviewed secondary research materials, and produced a final report and briefing.
From the outset, one thing became clear. Professionals at the Board of Education in Brooklyn as well as those in the schools at Ground Zero and throughout the five Boroughs of New York City conducted themselves with courage, clarity and conviction all toward the same goal of the safety and well being of all children in their care. Sadly, no other public or private institution experienced the levels of successful evacuation of nearly 9,000 children, staff and teachers from the area surrounding the Twin Towers without injury, though the heroic efforts of fire fighters and police led 25,000 occupants from the Towers. Approximately 2, 800 people died in the Towers among them 343 FDNY and 60 NYPD and Port Authority police and personnel\(^1\).

Something went right that day beyond all factors that could have conspired for things to go terribly, irrevocably wrong for school children in New York City -- as events did for so many others lost in the air and on the ground in these United States. In the days and months that followed the events of 9/11, the same dedication was manifest even as the complexities of recovery made decisions more controversial.

The final chapter of the report, entitled, *Looking Back: 9/11 Two Years Later*, offers insight into the resolution of issues that emerged in the early parts of recovery. In the interim between 9/11/2001 and 9/11/2003, the New York City Board of Education has become the New York City Department of Education. A new Chancellor was selected, Joel Klein, and changes also occurred in the senior executive management. With this change, a number of personnel who were originally involved in the 9/11 response and recovery, retired or took positions at other organizations. When they left their knowledge and experience left with them.

On 9/11 and afterward, one of the individuals deeply involved in response and recovery was Gregory Thomas. At the time of the World Trade Center attacks Thomas was Director of School Safety. He is now Director at the Program for School Preparedness and Planning at Columbia University’s National Center for Disaster Preparedness, Mailman School of Public Health. The Center focuses on how organizational systems, like school systems and public health systems, protect children and vulnerable populations in time of disaster. Thomas suggested that the original report would be enhanced by looking back at 9/11 and putting response and recovery into a longer-term perspective.

In addition to re-interviewing Gregory Thomas, the last chapter of this paper captures the thoughts of Ada Dolch, Principal of the High School of Public Service, a high school that sits right at Ground Zero. The issues of 9/11 as related to the impacts on safety as well as on the longer-term wellbeing of a community of teachers, students and staff are, clearly, specific to New York City and 9/11. The information about the particular set of impacts, however, offers a modeling opportunity for those who are charged with
the safety and wellbeing of students, nationwide. Thus, the update of this report and findings creates a unique contribution to that knowledge base.

This has been a difficult report to research and to write. The material of it conjures again and again the events of that day - the death, the destruction and the ultimate of human courage, responsibility and sacrifice.

It has been my honor to act as a researcher, as faculty to the graduate student researchers, and as the author of this report. It has also been an honor to work with the professionals of The Board of Education/Department of Education of the City of New York.

Nancy Degnan
October 2004
“No one is ready for something like this. We didn’t over-react. We were as clear as possible. We pulled together, got information out, and kept kids safe. I am very proud of our people.”

~ Harold O. Levy, Chancellor, New York City Board of Education

September 11, 2001 presented the greatest security challenge ever faced by the New York City Board of Education (BOE, hereafter). Its magnitude and scope far surpassed any emergency the system, or any other public education system in the country, had ever encountered. Review of the events pointed to several important factors of successful response and recovery actions. These included: organizational culture, degree of professional experience within the system, the retrofitting of standard operating procedures at the operation and programmatic levels, safety simulation and practice, and personal courage. All were articulated to the first order of commitment, the safety and well being of children. Indeed, in interviews with school officials, universal reference was made throughout to “our kids” (or our children) never, “the kids”. This cultural norm marked the response and recovery mode. In response, the on-the-ground decision makers at Ground Zero level succeeded in the secure evacuation of 9,000 students and staff. At the BOE, Chancellor Harold Levy decided to keep schools open, making the counter intuitive determination to forego reuniting children with families/caregivers immediately, and thus, maintaining the opportunity for orderly release and transport for students and staff citywide.

Recovery mode would become more controversial as decisions became more complex. Core to this was the challenge faced by BOE of how and how quickly to return to “normalcy”, particularly with respect to the re-opening of Stuyvesant High school, academically renowned within the New York City school system. At no time, however, did the decision makers deviate from the objective of sustained well being of students.

A set of other challenges would present itself to the BOE as recovery moved forward. Fiscal, curricular, mental health, inter-agency relations issues all emerged as actions and decisions by top management were crystallized and implemented. In addition, those engaged with the education system in development and delivery of services were impacted. The requirements of working with outside vendors, for instance, became more complex in consideration of heightened security. Likewise,
the BOE would work closely with mental health experts, community based organizations, and federal, state and city officials to ensure coordination of efforts, anticipation of needs and rapid problem solving.

Disaster planning encompasses 4 stages: prevention (mitigation), preparedness, response, and recovery. The “story” of the Board of Education and 9/11 should be read as a case study that seeks to illustrate two important components of Disaster Planning: Response and Recovery. A case study, as the researcher Robert Yin describes it, is “an inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context... and lends itself to what, how and why questions” (Yin 1989:16). Each person was asked to convey his/her part in the handling of the terrorist attack within the framework of questions: what did you do on 9/11 and the days that followed; how did you do it; and why did you take the actions you took? By posing these particular questions, the professionals could reflect on their own personal experiences and put those experiences/actions within a broader context of the organization of the Board of Education.

That the story of 9/11 does not focus on the aspects disaster planning involving prevention and preparedness is seen in the actual design of the three interview questions. However, what happened in response and recovery from the point of view of the 32 individuals most intimately involved can be woven back into a consideration of prevention/preparedness. The BOE story informs the first two stages in disaster planning from the perspective of the catastrophe of 9/11 -the only event that has been defined as the greatest attack against the United States. 9/11, furthermore, stressed every public and private system and in some cases rendered systems non-operational.

What is clear from the case study is that several aspects of disaster planning proved critical. These include: 1. Effective decision making on the part of those at the site of disaster is crucial. This leadership role is one that individuals need to be empowered to take on; likewise, they should be trained for this role prior to any event; 2. Emergency response plans ought to be constructed within a framework of meeting the key considerations in any emergency. However, they also need to be generic and dynamic enough to adapt to moment-to-moment requirements of the unfolding disaster; 3. The safety and well-being of responders including those in leadership roles must be a priority. Likewise, particular attention in response will be required for those who are most vulnerable including children and children with special needs. This focus has to continue into recovery stage; 4. Communications and communication systems will always be compromised, if not fail, as the disaster unfolds. Plans must allow for multiple means of communication in times of incomplete information or total communication blackout; 5. Resources will be stressed and must be assigned to
those, who need them most, first. How to prioritize in response is typically more straightforward than in recovery; 6. The recovery phase usually lasts longer and requires far greater planning and far greater resources than one can predict.

Points 5 and 6 have significant relevance for bureaucracies at the local, state and national levels. Organizations will find themselves needing to be flexible in their standard operating procedures particularly around getting money and finances into the system for programming designed to meet the ongoing needs. Likewise, bureaucracies should recognize that as recovery is a long process, and a complex one and it will sometimes, become political. Finally, recovery does have a goal and it is resiliency. How to define resiliency, how to recognize it, how to sustain it should also be a part of the holistic approach in disaster planning.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION
New York City Schools: The New York City Board of Education is the largest public school system in the United States. The system is a diverse one with nearly 120 different languages spoken by students and their families. The Board represents over 1.1 million students and approximately 140,000 staff.4 Table One indicates the breakdown of numbers of children at levels of education.5

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<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>Pre-Kindergarten</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Intermediate/Junior High School</th>
<th>High School</th>
<th>Special Education/Home Schooling</th>
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<tr>
<td>1,105,045</td>
<td>41,069</td>
<td>501,296</td>
<td>194,753</td>
<td>281,502</td>
<td>86,425</td>
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While the BOE understood that all children within the New York City system were impacted by 9/11, it also identified several groups of students that were most vulnerable in the wake of the events. These included those who: lost someone in their family (1,493)6, were evacuated from Ground Zero radius (approximately 9,000); witnessed the collapse of the Towers (some subset of 9,000); were members of the Arab or Muslim population.7 While response would focus in on the physical safety and well being of all students, recovery would particularly involve issues of mental well-being trauma mitigation, environmental concerns, temporary relocation, plans for return to normal operations, financial planning, and anti-bias curricular support.

The BOE would also need to address lost instructional time. Students from evacuated and closed schools were relocated within the system; and, eventually would be returned to their original schools. The impact for students in schools
outside of ground zero occurred as regular class time was replaced with an anti-bias curriculum and other related but necessary discussions on 9/11. Although these discussions took away from normal coursework, the mental health experts and professional staff advised the Board to prioritize them and support the classroom as a forum where students could discuss their feelings openly. Additionally, some schools experienced bomb threats during the weeks after 9/11; the learning environment was further disrupted by the anthrax episodes as well as by the tragic airplane crash in the Far Rockaways, in Queens, New York. The quick “return to normalcy” was, in some ways, predicated upon the desire to mitigate such disruptions. Inasmuch as New York State and Federal law requires testing of all New York City School children, BOE officials were concerned with academic outcomes for the year 2001-02. BOE officials calculated that the cost of lost instruction time, system-wide, approached $100 million. The BOE would make a request to the federal government (FEMA and the U.S. DOE) for that funding.

To provide a context for discussion, a Map of the World Trade Center and a Timeline of how the events of 9/11 unfolded are presented.
This map of the ground zero area shows the seven schools at the site. Murry Bergtraum High School (student enrollment is about 3,000) located at One Police Plaza was not included on this map because it is located outside the official Ground Zero Border. However, this school was evacuated along with those schools at Ground Zero on 9/11 because officials feared that One Police Plaza would be bombed.

As you will also notice, the World Trade Center was located very close to the shoreline of the Hudson River. Ferries (the Staten Island) and tugboats, as well as other vessels, operated in this waterway. As part of the evacuation on 9/11, principals and teachers would take advantage of this resource using creative adaptation of emergency planning to put their students on the ferries and tugboats. The students were transported to locations on Staten Island (NY) and New Jersey (see Chapter I).

The Timeline gives an example of how events at the World Trade Center coincided with decisions at the Board both at the central offices in Brooklyn and at the school level.

**Timeline**

**Tuesday, September 11, 2001**
- **8:46 a.m.**: Plane hits World Trade Center (World Trade Center) Tower #1
- **9:02 a.m.**: Plane hit World Trade Center Tower #2
  - Schools in the immediate area begin evacuation.
  - All other schools in NYC are placed on heightened security
- **9:17 a.m.**: The Federal Aviation Administration shuts down all New York City area airports.
- **9:21 a.m.**: The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey orders all bridges and tunnels in and out of the New York area closed.
  - Subway and bus system throughout the City are disrupted
- **9:59 a.m.**: The south tower of the World Trade Center (#2) collapses, plummeting into the streets below. A massive cloud of dust and debris forms and slowly drifts away from the building.
• 10:29 a.m. The World Trade Center’s north tower (#1) collapses from the top down as if it were being peeled apart, releasing a tremendous cloud of debris and smoke.\(^{14}\)
  - Airspace over the entire United States in the process of shut-down
  - Military flights begin over New York City

• 11:02 a.m. Area south of Canal Street is evacuated

• 2:49 p.m. Subway and bus service are partially restored in New York City.

• 5:20 p.m. The 47-story Building 7 of the World Trade Center complex collapses. The evacuated building is damaged when the Twin Towers across the street collapse earlier in the day. Other nearby buildings were burning.

• 9:57 p.m. Mayor Giuliani announces the Chancellor’s decision to close New York City schools on Wednesday

NB: By 1 a.m. on Wednesday, September 12, 2001, the BOE had accounted for the wellbeing of all students in the New York City School System.

METHODS OF RESEARCH
The immediate response and continued recovery actions taken by the New York City Board of Education on 9/11 have been documented in this report. Primary research came from 32 interviews conducted with decision makers and crisis management professionals across functional areas within the Board of Education, over a total time frame of about six months (October 2001 - March 2002). To ensure accurate attribution to them, the interviewees reviewed their transcripts. Research materials included Board of Education documents, memos, directives, news articles, and federal, state, and municipal agency reports. In addition, two individuals were re-interviewed for Chapter XI, Ms. Ada Dolch, Principal, The High School of Leadership and Public Service and Gregory Thomas, National Center for Disaster Preparedness, Mailman School of Public Health.

The Team of Student Researchers from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs is listed below.
• Yumie Song
• Peggy Borelli
• Kimberly Bayer
• Saroya Friedman
• Raul Galindo
• Miho Hirose
• Emily Joyce
• Jordan Lieberman
• Randi Marshall
• Nadine Mentor
• Tweeps Poli Phillips
• Damon Turner
KEY FINDINGS

DECISION MAKING
The successful decision making of the key Board personnel at the centralized and decentralized levels may be described by four factors: 1. Motivation to protect all people in the school system; 2. delineated chain of command and adaptation of standard operating procedures; 3. prioritization the life, safety and the safe reunion of children with parents; and 4. effective use of formal and informal networks to enhance institutional knowledge of recovery and response.

1. Motivation to Protect: The professionals at the Board of Education operated under an organizational cultural norm of “protecting our kids.” As events transpired on 9/11, at Ground Zero, principals and teachers would operate within this norm to provide the individual leadership and organizational focus required in decision making; at BOE headquarters, professionals engaged with the norm in the same fashion, even though the decision making impacted children at distances away from the attack.

In recovery, the mission of “protecting our kids” provided a clear direction as decision making became more complex. This complexity revealed itself as the depth of trauma emerged, as fiscal implications were discovered and as considerations of recovery for the broader community of New Yorkers dovetailed with those of students in the system. Effective emergency planning needs to incorporate the idea of establishing and maintaining organizational mission as a tool to guide response and recovery.

2. The Chain of Command and Adaptation of Standard Operating Procedures: Decision making during 9/11 epitomized the requirements of clearly delineating who is in charge, that is who takes on leadership in times of rapidly unfolding disaster and disrupted information and communication systems. On 9/11, in the centralized, decentralized structure of the schools system, principals and teachers made decisions for schools near the World Trade Center, because they knew they had to respond immediately; they were the best judges of the unfolding situation. Central Board decision makers, on the other hand, set protocols and plans, into place to guarantee safety of all personnel and students outside the environs of Ground Zero. This sharing of “command” resulted in effective response on 9/11. Likewise, the approach enabled effective recovery in the system.
The adaptation of procedures around transportation and communication are also notable. In transporting children safely, the OPT was able to use all its processes and expand them out to deal with the situation presented when New York City was under siege. For communication, adaptation was not as readily seen. What was learned from the 9/11 experience is that levels of technology are very important. The levels of technology proved important; that is, the simplest levels, like walkie-talkies, proved a more reliant tool than email, phones (including cell phones)—or technology at more sophisticated levels. Because technology was encumbered, the BOE had to be innovative in how it developed its plans and how and what it communicated to the rest of the system and the City. As was noted, “War rooms” were established where teams worked together to get the most current information on transportation routes. The Director of Communications, curtailed rumors by careful and concise review of any information that was promulgated to the public. And, extraordinary efforts from the school-level marked the day, as a principal from a school at the Ground Zero walked across Brooklyn Bridge to the Central BOE to report that her students were safe - even as she knew her sister died in the collapsed Tower.

3. PRIORITIZING LIFE, SAFETY AND SAFE REUNION: The events of 9/11 show that keeping track of children, as catastrophe unfolds and as evacuation occurs, is quite difficult. Teachers and principals need to develop a set of protocols that can be used in on-the-ground decision making situations, prior to any disaster occurring. Furthermore, these protocols should be communicated to the regional/district levels as well as to parents and caregivers. High school students must be trained to understand that their whereabouts in conditions of disaster are terrifically important to school and safety officials. If these older students leave the scene, they ought to report to district or regional offices within a specified amount of time, 18-24 hours, as an example. The experience of the 9/11 Ground Zero evacuation speaks to the merit of prioritizing orderly reunification information and action plans.

Notably, the plan for closing of schools and the safe transport of students from the New York City schools outside of Ground Zero was fully implemented within sixteen hours of the attack.

4. EFFECTIVE USE OF INFORMAL AND FORMAL NETWORKS: Chancellor Levy and his staff reached out to experts around the country within minutes of the attack on the World Trade Center. The experts were ready to support the BOE with the full content of the knowledge, experience and insight. For instance, Deputy Chancellor Anthony Shorris, who had been in the first World Trade Center
bombing in 1993, called to a colleague, Dr. Michael Cohen, who in Shorris’ words, “was literally around the corner.” Marleen Wong, Pam Cantor and other mental health experts supported the BOE in the content and in the logistics of mental health programming (at the levels, for instance, of broad research and interfacing with federal/state and local agencies to finance and manage programming)

Prior experience factored into the actions and thinking of leadership at BOE. Before becoming Chancellor, Levy had been with Solomon Smith Barney and had honed organizational leadership skills; similarly, Deputy Chancellor Shorris had done the same as part of the executive team at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

As has been noted, Shorris was present at the 1993 Bombing the Towers. The BOE’s Chief of External Relations, Burt Sacks had nearly 30 years in the education system, including working as a teacher and principal. Bill Casey and Judith Rizzo had broad and extensive knowledge of curriculum development as well as direct experience in the field of education. Office of Pupil Transportation, Kevin Gill and Rich Scarpa had nearly 25 years of experience between them in terms of operations and transportation planning. Gill’s contact with the local unions, bus drivers, vendors, and other suppliers proved critically important in a time of system-wide catastrophe. Gregory Thomas, head of safety for the Board was a former assistant commissioner of the NYC Fire Department and had a thorough knowledge of procedures and protocol in the Department as well as at the Board. His contacts with the Fire Department also helped facilitate his interactions with the Police and by extension, the Military and FBI. The professionals who staffed student services and mental health support as well as community outreach and budget were dedicated, knowledgeable individuals each of whom brought their own unique expertise as well at their collective knowledge to a team effort.

**TRANSPORTATION**

Overall, the “lesson” of transportation on September 11 was that the operations and procedures were flexible, and therefore, highly effective under catastrophic response and complex recovery. OPT’s expertise was clear at a number of different levels, including their: 1. technical knowledge; 2. vendor relationships; 3. broad and specific knowledge of their student population; 4. intra and inter-agency coordination; and 5. relationship with their constituency.

1. **Technical Knowledge:** The Office of Pupil Transportation tracking system is designed to transport approximately 170,000 students out of the 1.1 million total, on a daily basis. The 170,000 are children in the lower grades and/or with special
needs. On September 11, OPT either accommodated or coordinated the transport of every student in the entire system (a little under one million). The Mapping System revealed accurate and timely information. This example of crisis retrofitting SOP’s is wholly noteworthy.

2. **Vendor Relationships:** OPT has successfully interacted and worked with suppliers of transportation with whom they contracted, as evidenced by the rapidity and accuracy with which information was transmitted and alternate plans were put into place. *They were even part of the “war-room” team that met throughout recovery and response.*

3. **Knowledge of their Population:** Safe and adaptable transportation plans and the plan for handling the closing of schools must fit together, seamlessly. The decision to keep schools opened allowed for the necessary time (only about 2 hours, in the NYC example), to formulate the plan. The plan addressed the needs of the four types of students involved in closing, and again, normal protocol was shaped to meet their needs in catastrophe. The knowledge-base was already present and precise, and thus, integral to successful crisis-management.

4. **Intra and Inter-agency Coordination:** Professionals at BOE did their job as successfully because their connections, both formal and informal, with agencies such as the MTA, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which is the agency that runs the New York City public transportation system, were secure. Clearly, the ground-work of these relationships was accomplished during the normal interactions among the professionals. The handling of September 11 response and recovery, by OPT points to the importance of strong informal connections between and among agencies engaged in the transport of children throughout the system.

5. **Relationship with their Constituency:** Leadership of the OPT established from the outset that parents and children - entire families - were important to them. Outreach was the mantra. It was realized through: 1. setting up the process whereby parents, siblings and students could all ride on the buses, until comfort levels were achieved; 2. establishing of a hotline for parents to call; 3. updating of the BOE website with information on travel routes, on consistent bases; 4. conducting face-to-face meetings with parents in both large and small groups; and 5. remaining responsive to the impact of 9/11 on displaced families, on those who lost loved ones, and on the general disruptions that marked relocation and reopening of evacuated schools.
FACILITIES AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL

Overall the “lesson” of facilities for a complex educational system facing a catastrophe revealed that there would be: 1. impacts of disaster on school facilities; 2. use of schools for community roles in response and recovery; 3. redeployment of staff to help in recovery as school buildings are used by government agencies; and 4. very high costs that were often outside the eligibility guidelines for reimbursement.

1. IMPACTS ON SCHOOL FACILITIES: Terrorism is designed to injure or kill people and destroy property. Fortunately, no school building was compromised structurally on 9/11. However, given this fact, school buildings had to be quickly recast as areas for staging recovery operations. They became temporary morgues and shelters. Playgrounds stored the vehicles of those people who died in the Towers. Garbage and debris would accumulate as human and recovery activity occurred. And, it would have to be removed.

2. USE OF SCHOOLS FOR COMMUNITIES: Core to the community’s sense of recovery, is the return to school and the continuation of the education process. In NYC this would demand a rapid relocation of several thousand students to other schools around the City; expectations were that students would have to learn, and that staff and students would work together to absorb the upheaval. This was just a given. But it was a given with the backup of attention paid to the safety and security of unfamiliar neighborhoods and internal school environments. As with aspects of response, recovery involved teams of professionals working together for the best outcomes. Likewise, outreach to parents and community members as well as experts and consultants marked the planning and implementation of relocation.

3. LIMITATIONS ON MOVEMENT AND ACCESS: Access to the geographic area impacted by terrorism will be limited. “Frozen zone” is defined as a crime scene where special identification is required. Such was the experience for BOE personnel who needed to be at Ground Zero to review the impacts of the attack on their schools and facilities. In particular, military and police are required to patrol the impacted area. This situation creates, at least early in recovery, limitations on the movement of BOE professionals. Future planning might include recognition of this requirement and provide for contingencies, from coordinating with the security ID issuers to being part of the first inter-agency teams to enter “Frozen Zone” sites.

4. ROLE OF SUPPORT STAFF: Custodians, in particular, played an important role in keeping the impacts of the destruction minimized when they shut down air
ventilation systems. They also were tremendously helpful in the maintaining of school facilities as they were used by recovery workers and as they were cleaned for relocation and re-opening of schools. Their roles were, in a nutshell, ones of multitasking. Recognition of the importance of in depth knowledge of the building engineer staff is also crucial, and must be captured in any planning for future response.

FOOD SERVICES

“Lessons Learned” from Food Services can be found in: 1. The positive impact of Y2K in both logistics of staffing and the ability of the division and its staff to provide over 30,000 meals in a time of catastrophe; 2. the expanded knowledge base of the actual food requirements in recovery and response to an event such as September 11; 3. the importance of protection against food poisoning; 4. access to food storage. The reinforcement that education systems provide critical resources in terms of food during times of crisis.

1. EDUCATION SYSTEM PROVIDES A CRITICAL SERVICE OF FOOD DURING CRISIS: The Board’s capacity to feed so many people was vital in recovery from 9/11. School systems, as public sector entities, have large amounts of food and staff with the capability to provide mass feeding services. They are also at the front-line in any given geographic area hit by calamity. To be sure, the private vendors in the Ground Zero area provided food as recovery progressed, (e.g. Starbucks gave away thousands of cups of coffee, restaurants served meals, community based organizations did the same) however, in early hours/days of response and recovery it was the BOE that had both the supplies and staff to meet the high demand created by 9/11. In all communities, whether rural or urban, small or large, schools will be present and can be counted on to fulfill this resource need. Contingency planning needs to recognize this ability to contribute such a resource in overall community emergency plan.

2. THE POSITIVE IMPACT OF Y2K: Because of planning developed around Y2K, food services personnel were able to effectively take action in both the preparation and provision of food as well as in the tracking of those working on food services. The preparation and provision of food was crucial in response and the very early stages of recovery.

Payroll systems actually provided the information base on who was available to work and where they were. Likewise, the system for getting checks to individuals on hourly wage was effective. The system may have implications for both fiscal and project management in crisis situations. For example, other divisions of the
Board may share the requirement of knowing where people are, how to staff-up during crisis and how to account for and process the compensation for crisis management work. Disruption of salaries in time of attack can add to general level of misery and anxiety as well as broader economic impact, and if possible, should be avoided.

However, the BOE learned that chain of command and staffing became very challenging especially within the framework of providing personnel in “Frozen Zone” areas. This experience should alert emergency professionals to take these issues into account as they plan.

3. **AN EXPANDED KNOWLEDGE BASE WITH REGARD TO FOOD:** A unique comment by Mr. O’Brien had to do with the desire on the part of all those individuals at Ground Zero who worked in the tragic surroundings of 9/11. Clearly, this report is not intended to present insight into the chemistry of how human beings respond to “flight or fight” situations. Nonetheless, it is worth noting the type of food that was appealing to those who were engaged in the discovery and removal of bodies and in facing such overwhelming destruction. It is food of high carbohydrate content. Plans for food storage might be deliberate in their consideration of high carbohydrate foods for the initial response and recovery.

4. **THE PROTECTIONS AGAINST FOOD POISONING:** The experience of outbreaks of food poisoning during the recovery of the bombing of Oklahoma City was present in the minds of those responsible for the preparation and delivery of food, in New York City after 9/11. There were, in fact, no such similar events for New York City – again a testament to the professionalism of the food services division and the attention to detail with which they conducted themselves. Power surges and interruptions will be common in the presence of wide-spread or intense destruction. Awareness of this constraint is important in determining type and amount of food supplies.

5. **ACCESS TO FOOD STORAGE:** Access to stores of food can be problematic in crisis situations. Mr. O’Brien actually identified some changes in SOP’s (standard operating procedures) that could help in the future. These included: 1. having sets of backup keys to storage areas; 2. empowering food staff to make decisions when the chain of command is not present; 3. creating a system of personal identification that would mesh, in a much more timely fashion, with the requirements of securing a “Frozen Zone” after an attack or calamity. This last point fits into the broader overall review of coordination of 3 the BOE as an agency of response and recovery along with Fire and Police Departments, FBI and FEMA.
COMMUNICATION

The Lessons of Communication from the BOE are: 1. validity and timeliness of information; 2. coordination of sources of information as well as groups with which information is shared; 3. knowledge that technologies will fail and that a matrix of information dissemination tools will be necessary.

1. **VALIDITY AND TIMELINESS OF INFORMATION**: In chaos, clear, accurate, concise messages work best. A chain of command with a final point person who reviews information for this kind of content is quite effective in the management of communication during crisis. Teams should practice how this will happen when information is incomplete and disrupted. What type of message and at what intervals of timing are critical questions to be addressed and answered well before a disaster situation actually takes place.

In addition, the validity of information promulgated from the Chancellor’s office was assured by Levy’s participation in Giuliani’s daily 9/11 briefings. This was particularly relevant in the efforts of “returning to normalcy” as signified in the re-opening of schools system-wide and at Ground Zero.

2. **COORDINATION OF SOURCES OF INFORMATION**: Communication in crisis situations will require coordinated efforts, particularly in the presence of malfunctioning technology. Radio and television may be the best resource in early stages, while partnerships with outside organizations can assist in the longer term acquisition of what the impacts are revealed. As with the issue of clear and accurate information, the relationships with outside organizations should be fully developed so that when disaster happens, individuals within and outside the BOE know who to contact. BOE and their partners ought to also define and practice the pathways of information dissemination and plan for contingency if those pathways are disrupted.

3. **TECHNOLOGICAL FAILURE**: Technological failure is assured in events of the magnitude of 9/11. Therefore, vigilance with regard to have a scope of technologies available is important to future planning - from radio to websites to even public address systems within the schools. Technologies must also be prepared for failure of electrical power over large geographic areas. Individuals and teams may be designated to personally carry information to prepared centers for dissemination via individuals or groups of individuals. It is vitally important for all of us who seek an understanding of the impacts of 9/11 to remember that critical information was shared by individuals physically transporting their information - on foot - to the Central Administration of the BOE in Brooklyn.
Disaster that is terrorism is designed to disrupt at a number of locations and affect different systems. The most fundamental sharing of information may, in some instances, be dependent upon people bringing messages in person, should forms of technology be wholly undermined or electricity outages be severe and widespread. All preparedness efforts need to incorporate this possibility in disaster planning.

In addition, it is key that no emergency communication system be designed on a single method of communication. There must be multiple means of communication with each mode further based in redundancy. Likewise, power for communications has to come from multiple sources in the form of power back-up generators and/or ability to operate from batteries, as example.

MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
The “lessons” of the BOE’s mental health response are similar to others that have been revealed in the actions the Board took on 9/11. These include: 1. engaging experts in the design and delivery of mental health services; 2. gathering data and information that accurately told the story of the trauma and mental health impacts; and, 3. ensuring quality control of volunteer response; 4. need to Address Staff Mental Health Concerns; 5. pre-planning for Mental Health Services; 6. importance of Family Centered Services.

1. ENGAGING EXPERTS FOR THE MENTAL HEALTH RESPONSE: The BOE Student Services Team and the Chancellor set the tone for the mental health recovery plan from the very outset. They are to be commended. Their outreach to the mental health and trauma experts who had experience with both the Oklahoma City and the first World Trade Center bombings allowed for the managing of a situation which could have, naturally, been impacted by political and media pressures. The experts who comprised The Partnership for the Recovery in New York City Schools were also wholly engaged in the actual work of meeting the needs of children.

Likewise, the U.S. Department of Education through ProjectSERV provided extremely valuable funding, at very high levels of support, ($5 million) in the critical post 9/11 time period. FEMA also did its part in supporting the children and staff in the City schools. The role of these agencies and their staffs is highly commendable.

2. ATTENTION TO DATA AND INFORMATION GATHERING: The team in mental health response and recovery knew that they needed greater insight into both the short and long-term needs presented by the destruction and loss of 9/11. A needs
assessments provided the appropriate tools of scientific and psychological data gathering. The assessment not only identified immediate areas for concern, it also set the framework for analysis that will anticipate problems children might encounter in the future. Finally, the assessment is an invaluable contribution to the knowledge base concerning the kinds of reactions human beings may experience in similar situations. A compilation of how the BOE is actually addressing the needs, modes of intervention and treatment, will also constitute a tremendous contribution to the knowledge on how to effectively support individuals who have been traumatized by events similar to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

3. **Ensuring Quality Control**: The experience of 9/11 volunteer response is twofold, many individuals will want to help, and that mechanisms for screening them is essential. Likewise, the tools of handling in the enormous number of calls include: phone hotlines and a very well informed group of individuals handling those hotlines.

4. **Provide Mental Health Services for Staff**: In addition to the services provided for students it is important to consider the needs of staff. As was done in the case of the NYC BOE crisis management and mental health services were made available to staff.

5. **Pre-planning for Mental Health Crisis Teams is Critical**: From the events of 9/11 and other events of violence which have occurred at our nation’s schools it has become clear that events may occur in school which will require mental health services that exceed those normally available in schools. It is important that schools preplan for these events by developing relationships with consultants, mental health professionals and organizations for referral to allow for the creation of a mental health crisis plan.

6. **Mental Health Services Provided Should Address the Needs of the Entire Family**: While providing services to the students is the traditional thinking, one must recognize the context of the child within the family. Planning for crisis mental health services needs to address the needs of the entire family in order to provide the support children will need.

**Curriculum**
The role of the BOE beyond its commitment to protect children, is to teach children. And, for 9/11 they clearly succeeded. The lesson of curriculum is threefold: 1. Curriculum is a critically important component to the response and recovery from the educational process viewpoint; 2. curriculum development
effort reflected reflects the unique nature of the schools in which they are taught; 3. curriculum provided a conduit to continue to support the learning community on the unique issues of tragedy and terrorism.

1. Curriculum in Response and Recovery: The BOE was able to support teachers and students by September 13, within a day of the 9/11 attacks (given that schools were closed on September 12) with curriculum that was both grade sensitive and topic sensitive. It allowed teachers to conduct their classes within familiar structure of lesson plans. Likewise, it offered as clear a presentation and analysis of what had occurred within the City and the rest of the United States, as was possible within a few short hours of the attacks. Although constructed deliberately to ward off incidents of bias, the curriculum also filled the void of confusion, anger and fear created by the events of 9/11 for schools, system wide, and arguably for the communities in which the students live. As has been noted, there are no reported acts of bias in the school system stemming from 9/11.

As the weeks progressed, and the system entered recovery, the additional two phases of curriculum supported the “return to normalcy”. The presentation of curriculum in next two phases, furthermore, was adapted for greater learning outcomes. The curriculum incorporated experiential learning techniques as well as those of research, reading, and teamwork for optimum cognitive impact. Again, curriculum played an important role within the classroom setting as each new facet of the events of 9/11 unfolded in the media, and news.

2. Curriculum Reflecting Uniqueness: In the New York City Schools, 120 different languages are spoken by the children attending schools and members of the households from which they come. At the time of 9/11 the professionals at the BOE had little to draw on, in terms of curriculum for grades K-12 on terrorism and certainly none on the events of 9/11. The professionals at the BOE acknowledged this diversity and in fact, drew upon it, as they developed curriculum based on the events of 9/11. Furthermore, they introduced topics such as conflict resolution using examples that were familiar to children within the classroom. The curricular “fit” was an appropriate aspect of curricular development. Lastly, professionals followed what they set out for the rest of the educational community by ensuring that the curriculum was vetted before different political groups and community based and faith based organizations. This was important for demonstrating a commitment to the processes the curriculum encouraged. On a pragmatic level, the sharing of and incorporating views of disparate (possibly) groups ensured that the learning environment would not be further disrupted by public/legal challenges to the curriculum.
All of these experiences can be adapted to other school systems as professionals within them considered curriculum to address terrorism.

3. CURRICULUM PROVIDING A CONDUIT: Because we live in a “new” era of terrorism, the ways in which we teach our children and the manner by which we conduct ourselves will continue to be an important issue. The professionals of the BOE followed a framework that allowed for the maximum exchange of thoughts, ideas, knowledge to continue to militate against fear and support a true atmosphere of learning. It can best be summed up in the words of (former) Deputy Chancellor Judith Rizzo in a memo to Superintendents, entitled: Resources for Addressing Issues of Tragedy and Terrorism. She wrote:\textsuperscript{144}

\begin{quote}
Continue to provide an honest accounting of facts and relevant details, clarifying any misinformation or misunderstanding students may have about what happened. Honesty always helps to re-establish a feeling of security and trust.

Always build on what children already know and understand, and make judgments as to how much additional information to provide

Let students know that it is okay to talk about unpleasant events, and be willing to answer questions and make them feel comfortable by reminding them that there are no “silly” questions.
\end{quote}

Acknowledge their fears while simultaneously reassuring them. In the days and weeks ahead, there will be a need to provide continuous reassurances to our students.

FISCAL
The lessons of fiscal response and recovery are: 1. It is appropriate, when faced with catastrophe, to spend as requirements and needs dictate; 2. setting up specially designated accounts for spending supports tracking of how money was used, but not what priorities emerge by way of that use; and, 3. the eligibility requirements of agencies whose mission it is to reimburse in disaster (FEMA and others) do not always coincide with the reality of spending.

1. SPENDING AS NEEDS Dictate IN CATASTROPHE: The Chief Financial Officer and her staff’s most important decision on 9/11 and throughout the crisis was to provide permission for spending on various needs concerning the students.\textsuperscript{147} This
permission was given to allow the students to receive the services they needed to provide for their safety and well-being.

2. **Establishing Special Accounts and Codes**: This action allowed for ease with tracking spending as well as the kind of back-up materials required by FEMA and other agencies. In addition it helps capture costs that might be overlooked in the effort to provide the broadest levels of support across different functional areas of the BOE. For instance, that instructional costs turned out to be a major “hit” to finances caused by 9/11 can be demonstrated.

The accounting system should also have the ability to track and assign donations. Lastly the system should be discussed ahead of time with local representatives from FEMA and local and state disaster relief organizations. In this way these systems will be constructed in a manner which will maximize the potential for reimbursement in accordance with the rules of these funders.

3. **The Realities of an Era of Terrorism**: The BOE, by its experience with 9/11 has a wealth of knowledge to share with local, state and government agencies about the realities and impact of catastrophic events for schools. FEMA, in particular, learned that it had to adapt its eligibility requirements to meet the need of schools as distinct in terroristic situations. On the other hand, the BOE discovered that the kind of fiscal flexibility required of it in times of terror is not fully present. This was particularly relevant in relation to the U.S. DOE and its efforts to give the BOE money for mental health services. Thus, the BOE’s experiences illustrates that it is imperative that relief agencies and organizations adapt their reimbursement guidelines to address the full needs of schools that arise from terrorism.

4. **High Costs and Organizational Bureaucracy**: From the experience of the 9/11 terrorist attack it may be assumed that costs will far outstrip their reimbursement. Likewise there is a difference in the vocabulary, definitions, and regulations between budget divisions. Clarity on what is eligible for reimbursement may be elusive, and may require discussion and negotiation and ultimately an appeal or series of appeals.

**STUDENT SAFETY**

Safety in the New York City schools is a paramount objective of the BOE. As such, the dedication to it served the system very well in times of uncertainty and disaster, precisely because it is formulated on a decentralized basis and encourages “ownership” on the part of the Board Professionals within the schools
themselves. This ownership facilitated the on-the-ground decision making that resulted in the wellbeing of students and personnel who were in harm’s way at Ground Zero. Important aspects of student safety involves: 1. Involve other relevant agencies in the development of safety plans 2. Redundancy is integral to safety planning 3. Safety Plans should allow for crisis leadership 4. Student Safety and Accountability 5. All Hazards Planning 6. Incident Command and Incident Management this can be assured.

1. **INVOLVE OTHER RELEVANT AGENCIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SAFETY PLANS**: It is important that all relevant agencies including law enforcement, fire service, EMS, public health and emergency management at a minimum are both involved in the development of school safety plans and their evaluation.

2. **REDUNDANCY IS INTEGRAL TO SAFETY PLANNING**: School safety plans should allow for multiple approaches to handle situations. This will allow for alternatives should an initial approach fail or become unavailable.

3. **SAFETY PLANS SHOULD ALLOW FOR CRISIS LEADERSHIP**: In the end those at the scene must be empowered and trained to make independent decisions. Information and communication is often limited and those present will have to make independent decisions in times of crisis. Preplanning and training should allow for this.

4. **STUDENT SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY**: As the schools are responsible for the care and safety of the children entrusted to them, school safety plans must include the priorities of assuring student safety under all events and providing multiple methods of accounting for the whereabouts and status of all children during an event. This should be a repetitive process and include the process for release of students into the care of their parents and others in the absence of their parents including documentation and communication of these events.

5. **ALL HAZARDS PLANNING**: As history has shown time and time again one can never predict the variability of events which can occur. As such safety plans should take an all-hazards approach to allow adaptation and planning for any event which may occur.

6. **INCIDENT COMMAND AND INCIDENT MANAGEMENT**: It is important the school safety plans be able to interact with the plans of other agencies and the community wide plans. In order to facilitate this cross agency collaboration and connection common terminology and approach is imperative. By using the common principles of Incident Command Systems and Incident Management this can be assured.
CHAPTER I - DECISION MAKING

On September 11, 2001 over 9,000 students, staff and teachers were safely evacuated from schools in the immediate vicinity of ground zero schools and One Police Plaza. In addressing the crisis, the Board of Education successfully retrofit operations and procedures. However, the response that enabled the safety and well being of evacuated persons as well as the remainder of 1.1 million people system-wide was achieved through critical use of on-the-ground decision making, informed by intelligence, creativity, and courage.

“I asked every teacher who was left and they knew exactly who [which students] they had. I was the last one out. I grabbed my purse, grabbed some of the kids’ records and locked the door like I would be back tomorrow. We evacuated between 75-100 kids. We evacuated right after the first tower collapsed. There was a rush of people up our street and vehicles rushing down the street. It was frantic…the safety plan was not that relevant in this situation. The one thing I knew to do was to sweep [final search] the building, so we had the fireman (custodian) do that. We couldn’t use the safety plan-it said to evacuate to Stuyvesant across the street.”

~ Principal, BOE

“You have to… compile and disseminate clear, concise information; extend empathy and understanding; say yes; say no; resist being dragged into the fear of it; deliver what you promise, always; keep lines of communication open; treat everyone as an individual; and ask of others, only what I ask of myself.”

~ Burt Sacks, (Former) Chief Executive, Division of External Relations

“At the same time at ground zero, teachers were making decisions on their own. They had evacuation plans - but evacuation plans said to go to Stuyvesant...or elsewhere. They all did the right thing. One principal sent her kids on the Staten Island Ferry... Kids ended up at Curtis High School. This principal knew she had to get all her kids out and then she walked [to Brooklyn], here into my office with dust all over her in shock... She felt she had to report where her kids were and what happened. There was extraordinary sense of duty and obligation in the system. At the site itself, people reacted very well.”

~ Harold O. Levy, (Former) Chancellor of New York City School System
RESPONSE

On 9/11, the primary and most difficult task for the Board of Education was the safe evacuation of all students, teachers, and staff in the vicinity of the World Trade Center. Then, in the minutes and hours following the attacks, the Board focused its efforts on two objectives: locating all of its children and adults and transporting all to safety.

The safe and quick transport of students out of the danger zone immediately following the attacks became the responsibility of the teachers, principals, and superintendents in the schools in the radius of Ground Zero. With communication down and limited access to the Board of Education’s office in Brooklyn, school principals had to rely upon their own decision making skills and experience to safely evacuate more than 9,000 people from the area. The transportation and safe discharge of the remaining 1.1 million (approximately) school children throughout the City would be the responsibility of the Chancellor and his staff, in particular, the Office of Pupil Transportation. The Board would also assume responsibility for coordinating with officials in the private and parochial schools to ensure the wellbeing of that portion of the student population. Children in non-public schools make-up approximately 20 percent of pupils in New York City.

The World Trade Center attack occurred on the fourth day of a new school year, before principals and teachers had an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the students or the parents. The affected schools included primary and intermediary schools: P.S. 234, P.S. 150, P.S. 89, I.S. 89, P.S. 721 and high schools: Stuyvesant High School, High School of Leadership and Public Service, the High School of Economics and Finance and Murry Bergtraum High school (across from One Police Plaza).15

Each school in the New York City system is required to file a safety plan with the Board of Education and the New York City Police Department.16 Gregory Thomas, Director, Student Safety and Prevention, headed the office that oversees the process of schools developing and submitting plans to meet the requirement. He and his staff were also responsible for helping to ensure safe environments within the school buildings and in the communities around the schools.17

School safety plans stipulate the protocol taken in an emergency; and, these plans are updated every year.18 The Board of Education, New York City Police Department, and the Fire Department work together for the security of students within the school system19. One specific element of these plans, fire drills, are required to be tested twelve times a year. Principals of the schools at Ground
Zero would later attest to the importance of fire drills and their role in supporting the calm and orderly nature of the evacuation.

Respecting protocol, principals from each of the schools around Ground Zero made contact with the superintendent’s office immediately after the first plane hit Tower One. A preliminary decision was that all students were to remain in the schools, because the buildings had structural stability and safety. In addition, principals allowed children to leave if their parents came to pick them up. However schools differed in their policies regarding students leaving with non-parents. For example, one principal only allowed a parent or guardian listed on the child’s emergency card to take the child home. Yet, other principals allowed any adult with whom they were familiar with to sign students out and left specific instructions on where that child went in case the parents came to the school. The Board of Education made the decision that all other schools outside the affected area should hold the children until an adult picked them up.

When the second plane hit the Tower Two, however, evacuation of schools began. The High Schools of Economics and Finance and Leadership and Public Service are located just 200 yards from the World Trade Center on Trinity Place.

Plans for both of these high schools identified a third high school, Stuyvesant High School as the safety location. However, Stuyvesant High school was north of the World Trade Center. In order to reach the high school, students and staff would have to pass directly through the attack area. The decision was made by principals at the scene to modify the safety plans and instead evacuate south of the World Trade Center. The only means of transportation in the affected vicinity was by walking. Students and staff were already walking away from the school as the North Tower collapsed. A principal described the scene:

_We were joined in the street by people fleeing from the Towers covered in ash...We left right before the North Tower came down. We heard this unbelievable rumble and everyone turned in disbelief. The building fell like a stack of cards. We walked together, told the kids to move quickly and keep their heads down. I wasn’t scared, it was very communal... it was difficult to walk... I had to throw rubber tubing out of the way..._

Along with the high schools, Primary Schools I.S. and P.S. 89 as well as P.S. 150 were evacuated. All were supposed to evacuate to Stuyvesant as was required for the high schools. Principals and teachers had to make a similar decision to find an alternate safety route and instead of Stuyvesant they went to P.S. 3 on
Christopher Street and Hudson. The principals consulted with district offices as well as safety officials and indicated their change of plan. The teachers led the children in an orderly manner towards their evacuation site. They endeavored to keep in contact with the district office while en route but eventually lost cell phone capability. Once at the evacuation site, the principals and staff worked assiduously with other parents to locate each remaining child’s parent and get each child home safely.

At about 10:30 a.m., police officials ordered the evacuation of Stuyvesant High School itself. Students left by the North entrance (again away from the World Trade Center) and dispersed throughout the City. The anecdotes concerning how students reached safety are many. Ninety-four of these students spent the night on cots at Curtis High School in Staten Island after taking the ferry from Manhattan. Principals and teachers flagged down a tugboat at Battery Park that took some students to Upper Manhattan and Queens. School officials escorted many students on ferries to Staten Island and New Jersey. One principal walked her students across the Brooklyn Bridge to take her students to safety.

BOE officials noted that re-unification of children and parents presented enormous challenges. At Ground Zero, parent concern during these hours was exacerbated by disruptions in communication and the need to deviate from safety plans. In addition, the chaos that was unfolding at the World Trade Center fed fears that children were in danger or worse, injured or dead. Terrorism promoted a particular kind of chaos. It is clear for instance that in the evacuation of the World Trade Center collapse keeping track of children at the primary school level was more effective than at the high school level. Likewise, the actions of BOE staff were illustrative of the requirements to be adaptive in response to unfolding events, while remaining vigilant to the highest priority of keeping children and staff safe.

From the moment the first plane hit the Tower at 8:46 am to the return of children to home at 1 am on the morning of September 12, it took sixteen hours to locate and/or ensure the reuniting of children with their families. There is no comparable disaster to contrast with this time frame. Nonetheless, taking note of it may inform future planning involving evacuation in large and complex educational systems. The geography of New York City clearly impacted the routes and methods of evacuation. Other school systems may want to seriously consider their geographical contours when developing safety plans in an era of terrorism. In addition, the neighborhoods and communities throughout the five Boroughs (as well as in New Jersey) made room for anyone that was seeking haven. Chancellor Levy remarked in an interview, “One lesson I learned was about the social
structure of the City - it’s much stronger than I thought. All the kids were absorbed.”

The BOE personnel engaged in responding to terrorism at the World Trade Center were acting with incomplete information. Nonetheless, their decisiveness was key to the well being of their students.

Back at the BOE Headquarters in Brooklyn, Chancellor Levy and his staff were working to develop strategies for the system to be put in place as the immediate dangers of the ground zero were handled. Again these strategies were being developed within crisis management marked by incomplete information.

The overriding objective was to get 1.1 million children home and re-united with their families. In consultation with senior staff, the Chancellor made the decision to keep all New York City schools open. This step was predicated upon: The necessity to keep the subways from being used during the very first hours after the collapse for the safety of students; knowledge that streets were impassable; the closure of bridges and tunnels for bus traffic; the relative safety of the schools themselves. Chancellor Levy was also concerned that parents would not be able to get home and ultimately, in his words, he “was concerned that we might have orphans.”

Chancellor Levy’s decision was met with some initial resistance from New York City’s Mayor Giuliani, which was quickly overturned by Chancellor Levy’s arguments and his ability to take a major concern from the Mayor’s hands.

Throughout the day, Chancellor Levy continued to monitor the crisis, and contacted the chancellor of schools in Oklahoma City. Chancellor Levy also provided instruction to staff at both the central and decentralized levels in 3 separate emails with the final email being sent at 5:49 p.m., notifying all school personnel that schools would be closed September 12. In that email he also asked all principals, assistant principals, guidance counselors, social workers, psychologists and crisis teams to report to their schools to prepare plans to respond to the tragedy. Chancellor Levy explained his decision in this way:

*We made the decision not to open schools the following day. The whole city was reeling. Transportation system was still out of whack. We asked teachers and principals to come to school if they could. We had to deal with the psychological response - I talked to the commissioner of education from Oklahoma. Others talked to LA and Columbine. We pulled things off the Internet and we put a package together and replicated it for schools as the basis on which to conduct themselves.*
Also, throughout the day, Chancellor Levy’s staff compiled the teaching and administrative support materials that would be required at the schools.

One team worked on a K-12 Curriculum which focused on how to understand and process the events of 9/11. Of particular concern to everyone was the real possibility of bias-related attacks on Muslims or people appearing to be Muslims. The anti-bias curriculum was produced and delivered to schools by the very next day, September 12.

Likewise, the team for student support services was handling an onslaught of calls to help with emotional trauma and mental well being. The response included two main objectives. First, all calls were answered, and accurate information on how the Board manages volunteer services was imparted; and, second, Board professionals began (almost immediately) to put together materials supporting teachers for recognizing trauma and mental health crisis in children.

At a broader level, BOE decision makers began contacting experts who had dealt with impacts of violence on schools, school systems and the children within them. Chancellor Levy and his Deputy Chancellor Anthony Shorris reached out to experts around the country saving valuable time in understanding what had to be done by September 12 and 13. Being stymied or stumped in actions was simply not acceptable in a crisis of this magnitude. It was in the hours soon after the terrorist attacks that people such as Marleen Wong of the Los Angeles Unified School District, Dr. Michael Cohen, a psychologist who had worked on issues after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and Dr. Pam Cantor of the Children’s Mental Health Alliance, and Yale University were all contacted for the expertise and support. Each provided valuable insight on how to work with organizations such as FEMA and the Department of Education (Wong) and create groups such as the Partnership for Recovery of the New York City Schools (Cohen and Cantor) providing for coordinated efforts in mental healing as well as much needed oversight.

In handling communication out of the Board to the media the Board decided immediately to vet all information before the Chancellor. No one but the Chancellor (although sometimes through his public information officer) was empowered to convey status of the system to the media. The dedication to accurate information dissemination continued after 9/11 and was supported by the fact of Levy’s presence at each of Mayor Giuliani’s daily 9/11 briefings.

Schools opened two hours late on September 13, with: the safe evacuation of 9,000 students and staff from ground zero; the re-uniting of 1.1 million children,
system-wide, with families; an anti-bias curriculum in place; coordination and planning for mental health established; outreach to experts conducted; fiscal plans being put into place; and physical clean-up underway.

**RECOVERY**

Recovery for the school system was multifaceted and complex. While the Board was engaged in recovery throughout City schools, they were also focused on working with teachers, parents, children, and the emergency professionals in the evacuated and relocated schools. While the BOE had received tremendous support from experts who had worked in recovery in Oklahoma City, Columbine and in other disasters, still much needed to be understood about the scope and duration of recovery.

System-wide concerns included lost instructional time, transportation, curriculum development and mental health support for all students. For the schools at Ground Zero the Board was engaged in planning for relocation of students. In addition, they took on the support of schools as public sector facilities used in recovery. The evacuated schools at Ground Zero functioned as morgues and shelters. The “school house” became the purview of FEMA, City police and fire fighters, FBI and the military; BOE custodians and engineers remained in the school buildings to ensure the safety and well being of rescue personnel and emergency officials. Furthermore, central office BOE professionals supported operations like food delivery, production and distribution, garbage removal, and supply delivery. Overarching all of these activities was the attention paid to the environmental considerations and air quality risks and the requirement of the physical clean up of the eight schools at Ground Zero. In addition, the magnitude of the fiscal impact of recovery for the education system was becoming clearer and clearer as specifics of recovery were presented.

The BOE faced controversy in relocating and re-opening evacuated schools, considered by some as having hazardous air quality. In addition, the BOE remained firm in its pre-9/11 requirement to administer the standardized testing for grade advancement. The BOE thought it important to maintain this standard even in the face of disruptions to the system.

The actual process of relocating students in new schools and then a few months later returning the students to their original schools took a significant amount of coordination and time. Transportation, safety and instructional issues were addressed as well as ongoing sense of responsibility to communicate with parents about how the Board was working through these issues. Parents were concerned that their children would be unsafe in new neighborhoods and school buildings.
They and the children were impacted by transport through relatively long distances to the relocated schools. For instance, it was possible that some students could be on buses three to four hours a day as new routes were being developed due to road detours and closing. For students traveling by subways, the disruptions would continue for several months.48

Board professionals responded to these complexities at both an interpersonal and technical level. Burt Sacks, Chief Executive, Division of External Relations spearheaded the relocation and reopening of impacted schools. He defined meeting with parents, school officials, union members and students as a priority of recovery. In addition, Mr. Sacks worked closely with Kevin Gill on transportation. Mr. Gill focused on easing transitions during the months following September 11. One example is Mr. Gill’s actions around familiarizing entire families with new bus routes by allowing parents and siblings of students with special needs to ride with them until a sense of comfort was achieved49 (see Chapter II). Likewise, Stephen O’Brien, Coordinator of Food Services for Manhattan, made certain that the very first school breakfast for relocated children was familiar, warm and aromatic - and staffed by the same food providers in the schools the children typically attended. Children got to see the people they always saw at breakfast, a source of comfort and continuity in a very mixed-up time.50

In addressing environmental concerns, the Board committed to complete clean-up of the schools. In particular for the evacuated schools, the commitment was to “convince parents that schools would be safe.”51 Again, officials at the Board turned to experts. Environmental staff who worked within the organization contracted with health and safety experts at Mt. Sinai Hospital and at New York University.52 Two other sets of environmental consultants were hired, those of the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) and those hired by parent associations.53 Extensive testing of air quality occurred at various intervals of the week as well as the 24 hours of a day. The physical clean-up of debris from the Towers’ collapse, of course, happened around-the-clock. A specific controversy emerged with regard to an EPA Ombudsman Report54 of poor air quality, particularly at Stuyvesant High School. It was balanced by the other (independently secured) consultant reports and by the willingness of the Board to work with the consultants, parents and the Teachers’ Union and consider their recommendations.

Recovery necessarily involved lost instructional time. The Board’s decision to remain steadfast in testing, as stated previously, met with resistance by parents and some educators.55 Interestingly, test scores for grades 3 and 4 in District 2
Schools evacuated on September 11 and engaged in relocation, -- P.S. 89, P.S. 150, and P.S. 234 - indicated an increase, or nearly equal, levels of performance from 2001-2002. In all cases, these schools outperformed schools citywide.56

While no direct correlation can be made between the performance of these schools and the actions of the BOE in recovery, the support of the BOE most certainly had beneficial impact on the magnitude of disruption. Students and teachers did continue their work of learning in these schools and it was measured positively. Furthermore, the BOE’s requirement of testing has actually enabled the documentation of a school year like no other. The data is unique, important to the understanding of effects, and hopefully informative to educators and others interested in the well-being of school children.

ASSESSMENT
The successful decision making of the key Board personnel at the centralized and decentralized levels may be described by four factors: 1. Motivation to protect all people in the school system; 2. delineated chain of command and adaptation of standard operating procedures; 3. prioritization the life, safety and the safe reunion of children with parents; and 4. effective use of formal and informal networks to enhance institutional knowledge of recovery and response.

1. **Motivation to Protect:** The professionals at the Board of Education operated under an organizational cultural norm of “protecting our kids.” As events transpired on 9/11, at Ground Zero, principals and teachers would operate within this norm to provide the individual leadership and organizational focus required in decision making; at BOE headquarters, professionals engaged with the norm in the same fashion, even though the decision making impacted children at distances away from the attack.

In recovery, the mission of “protecting our kids” provided a clear direction as decision making became more complex. This complexity revealed itself as the depth of trauma emerged, as fiscal implications were discovered and as considerations of recovery for the broader community of New Yorkers dovetailed with those of students in the system. Effective emergency planning needs to incorporate the idea of establishing and maintaining organizational mission as a tool to guide response and recovery.

2. **The Chain of Command and Adaptation of Standard Operating Procedures:** Decision making during 9/11 epitomized the requirements of clearly delineating who is in charge, that is who takes on leadership in times of rapidly unfolding disaster and disrupted information and communication systems. On 9/11, in the
centralized, decentralized structure of the schools system, principals and teachers made decisions for schools near the World Trade Center, because they knew they had to respond immediately; they were the best judges of the unfolding situation. Central Board decision makers, on the other hand, set protocols and plans, into place to guarantee safety of all personnel and students outside the environs of Ground Zero. This sharing of “command” resulted in effective response on 9/11. Likewise, the approach enabled effective recovery in the system.

The adaptation of procedures around transportation and communication are also notable. In transporting children safely, the OPT was able to use all its processes and expand them out to deal with the situation presented when New York City was under siege. For communication, adaptation was not as readily seen. What was learned from the 9/11 experience is that levels of technology are very important. The levels of technology proved important; that is, the simplest levels, like walkie-talkies, proved a more reliant tool than email, phones (including cell phones)—or technology at more sophisticated levels. Because technology was encumbered, the BOE had to be innovative in how it developed its plans and how and what it communicated to the rest of the system and the City. As was noted, “War rooms” were established where teams worked together to get the most current information on transportation routes. The Director of Communications, curtailed rumors by careful and concise review of any information that was promulgated to the public. And, extraordinary efforts from the school-level marked the day, as a principal from a school at the Ground Zero walked across Brooklyn Bridge to the Central BOE to report that her students were safe - even as she knew her sister died in the collapsed Tower.

3. Prioritizing Life, Safety and Safe Reunion: The events of 9/11 show that keeping track of children, as catastrophe unfolds and as evacuation occurs, is quite difficult. Teachers and principals need to develop a set of protocols that can be used in on-the-ground decision making situations, prior to any disaster occurring. Furthermore, these protocols should be communicated to the regional/district levels as well as to parents and caregivers. High school students must be trained to understand that their whereabouts in conditions of disaster are terrifically important to school and safety officials. If these older students leave the scene, they ought to report to district or regional offices within a specified amount of time, 18-24 hours, as an example. The experience of the 9/11 Ground Zero evacuation speaks to the merit of prioritizing orderly reunification information and action plans.
Notably, the plan for closing of schools and the safe transport of students from the New York City schools outside of Ground Zero was fully implemented within sixteen hours of the attack.

4. **Effective Use of Informal and Formal Networks:** Chancellor Levy and his staff reached out to experts around the country within minutes of the attack on the World Trade Center. The experts were ready to support the BOE with the full content of the knowledge, experience and insight. For instance, Deputy Chancellor Anthony Shorris, who had been in the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, called to a colleague, Dr. Michael Cohen, who in Shorris’ words, “was literally around the corner.” Marleen Wong, Pam Cantor and other mental health experts supported the BOE in the content and in the logistics of mental health programming (at the levels, for instance, of broad research and interfacing with federal/state and local agencies to finance and manage programming)

Prior experience factored into the actions and thinking of leadership at BOE. Before becoming Chancellor, Levy had been with Solomon Smith Barney and had honed organizational leadership skills; similarly, Deputy Chancellor Shorris had done the same as part of the executive team at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

As has been noted, Shorris was present at the 1993 Bombing the Towers. The BOE’s Chief of External Relations, Burt Sacks had nearly 30 years in the education system, including working as a teacher and principal. Bill Casey and Judith Rizzo had broad and extensive knowledge of curriculum development as well as direct experience in the field of education. Office of Pupil Transportation, Kevin Gill and Rich Scarpa had nearly 25 years of experience between them in terms of operations and transportation planning. Gill’s contact with the local unions, bus drivers, vendors, and other suppliers proved critically important in a time of system-wide catastrophe. Gregory Thomas, head of safety for the Board was a former assistant commissioner of the NYC Fire Department and had a thorough knowledge of procedures and protocol in the Department as well as at the Board. His contacts with the Fire Department also helped facilitate his interactions with the Police and by extension, the Military and FBI. The professionals who staffed student services and mental health support as well as community outreach and budget were dedicated, knowledgeable individuals each of whom brought their own unique expertise as well at their collective knowledge to a team effort.
CHAPTER II - TRANSPORTATION

The relocation of students and transportation of special education children, primary and intermediary students necessarily became a chief concern of the Board of Education. The chapter suggests that Office of Pupil Transportation (OPT)’s customized tracking system was instrumental in the Board’s ability to manage the transportation system during a time of crisis. Likewise, the management-staff networks supported system wide problem-solving and coordination.

“I was heading into Manhattan for an Office of Emergency Management meeting... then I got a call to turn around and return to the Long Island City Office. It took more than an hour to get back...by then all our phone communication was virtually useless. A lot of bus companies’ radio systems were located at the World Trade Center too. Phone and radio contact was lost with drivers. I got back just as the first building collapsed. I walked in and the first thing I said was that we all have to remember to remain calm.”

~ BOE Official

“Mr. Gill’s instructions were clear... our mission was to get our children home safely...”

~ BOE Official

RESPONSE

The New York City Board of Education is responsible for the transport of approximately 170,000 students a day - 62,000 of whom are children with special needs - in the primary and many intermediary schools. Many of the children within the system have working parents and guardians who rely on after-school programming to coincide with their workday. Nearly 700,000 Middle and High school students travel by the subways and are given Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) passes. In addition, 20% of children in New York City are from parochial or private schools. On 9/11, the BOE worked together with the leadership of the non-public schools to ensure the wellbeing of these groups of students.

The Office of Pupil Transportation (OPT) achieved the paramount goal of September 11 -- the safe return of all children to their homes located throughout the five boroughs of New York City. OPT and BOE staff accomplished this by
locating all the evacuated children and developing plans for transporting all other children who went to school that day.\textsuperscript{57} In recovery, transportation issues would continue as challenges.

In a system as large as that of New York City, transporting children to and from school happens in a number of different ways. Very soon after the first Tower fell, BOE officials set up a “war room” with maps and OPT’s tracking system as their tools of information.\textsuperscript{58} Staff of the “war room” was comprised of BOE officials as well as vendors who had been asked to help think through the logistics of transportation in a city that had experienced an attack. As noted, the first plane hit at 8:46 am. By 12:25 pm, staff were sufficiently well informed to provide Chancellor with the details of the BOE’s plans for safe transport of all New York City school children. In an email entitled: \textit{World Trade Center Explosions II},\textsuperscript{59} Chancellor Levy laid out the plan. He asked BOE professionals\textsuperscript{60} to take the following actions: use all staff to provide security; re-deploy staff from district offices to the schools; cancel all after school programming; and solicit the support of all staff in school closing. The Chancellor’s directive encompassed four groups of students in the closing process: \begin{enumerate}
\item Children who walked to and from school;
\item Children who traveled by subway;
\item Children who traveled by yellow bus; and
\item Children, with special needs, who traveled by bus or ambulance.\end{enumerate}

The Chancellor’s directive laid-out the conceptual framework for the actual implementation of transporting children and getting them home on 9/11.

First, schools would remain open under \textit{shelter conditions} for children who were normally dismissed at the end of the day and walked home. This guaranteed safety until parents were able to reach them. Second, students who traveled by subway were to remain at school until the transit system was fully operational. Third, students who used yellow bus system would be transported as usual. In the instance, however, where no parent or guardian was present to meet the child as he/she disembarked from the bus, the student would not be dropped off. Instead, the child would be brought to the designated site in the district where she/he would remain with staff until the parent/guardian appeared. Finally, special education students would be transferred by their normal buses/ambulances and dropped off to a guardian/parent. The complications with special education children, however, proved troublesome. Many of the buses and ambulances transporting the children were redeployed to the disaster area. Some children needed medical attention in a time frame that would prove shorter than what it took to get them home. While this situation did not end in fatalities or severe injury, it nonetheless was a problem. In addition, an escort and a driver are required for special education children. The coordination of these personnel was an added consideration in the safe transport of students with special needs.
Finally, the buses transporting students on September 11 had to get special manifests to go into and out of Manhattan due to the shutting down of the bridges and tunnels. The Board of Education was able to account for all students, teachers, and staff by 1:00 a.m. on September 12, finally knowing that everyone was safe and unharmed.

Effective management of the bus operators with the use of OPT’s tracking system allowed the staff to carry out their mission for the day: safely transporting students home. This required the re-mapping of all bus routes and constant communication with all schools, vendors, bus operators, and city officials. By 2:49 p.m., subway and bus services were partially restored in New York City. By 7:02 p.m., some New York City bridges opened for outbound traffic. As soon as the streets were passable, the OPT coordinated the bus operators to safely transport all students home who were still at schools and shelters throughout the city. In one particular instance, a bus had to be dispatched to Jersey City where a church was sheltering 20 New York City students. Buses were dispatched the next day for these and other students who were housed in shelters. The Board of Education worked in conjunction with the NYC Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and the NYC Police Department to safely transport students home.

**RECOVERY**

As has been noted in Chapter I, on September 12, 2001 all NYC schools were closed, but all district and central administrative offices were open. School officials had been requested to report to school to prepare for students return. With the exception of schools below 14th Street (or Canal; please see Timeline), NYC schools reopened after a two-hour delay on September 13, 2001. On this day as well, all after-school, evening, and Public School Athletic League (PSAL) programs were cancelled. From the onset, officials made the decision to have OPT staff operate a 24-hour hotline to address parent concerns. This hotline gave parents access to information but also calmed their fears and concerns about their child’s safety.

The issue of transportation once again became very important in the reassignment of students to host schools in the aftermath of the crisis. Affected schools were relocated to other schools throughout Manhattan and Brooklyn. For each school that was displaced, a transportation plan was developed. OPT’s tracking system is a customized program of a sophisticated mapping data with details of a student in any given geographic location. The data can be filtered to locate all “special aid” children that need special equipment in order to get to school. The student’s medical needs can be matched and provide a route that
will best transport the child home from any location in New York. This tracking system was critical in the reassignment of bus routes during the chaos of 9/11. Bus services were now revised and extended to accommodate the reassignment of schools. In addition, many families, who had been living near the World Trade Center, were displaced and children had to be picked up and dropped in different areas. Board of Education officials shuttled parents to schools in certain instances to attend meetings and to survey the host schools.

BOE officials formed a committee with parents to educate individuals about the different routes and update changes. Gathering information from the group as well as relying on OPT data, support mechanisms were created to facilitate the transport. District 2 of the school system, which was a District greatly impacted by the attacks provided metro cards to parents and students who needed them. Because of this, parents who did not want to put their children on public transportation alone, were able to accompany them on the subway. Buses were the primary means of travel for primary and special education students. OPT also allowed for parents and siblings of special education students to ride in the buses with the children so that the new routes would be cause for less apprehension.

For the High school students, there was a need to work with the MTA to discuss bus routes and train services that students would now have to take to attend the reassigned schools. Also in the months following 9/11, train lines were removed, reduced, or revised because of structural damages. This information had to be constantly relayed from the Board to students to ensure that they would be able to safely return to and from school. Additional security and school officials stood by the subway stations to safeguard the transference of relocated students to their temporary schools.

OPT estimates that the direct costs incurred included the costs of 19 buses with indirect costs including 14 additional vehicles. Costs estimated at $400-$500 per vehicle per day, included the wear and tear on buses that had to endure longer routes. The 19 direct additional buses were provided for P.S. 89, P.S. 234 and P.S. 150. The 14 indirect vehicle costs were for the Special Education students who were affected by the relocation as a result of the attack. In addition, there are the costs of additional manpower as well as the cost of the metro cards. (see Chapter VIII)
ASSESSMENT

Overall, the “lesson” of transportation on September 11 was that the operations and procedures were flexible, and therefore, highly effective under catastrophic response and complex recovery. OPT’s expertise was clear at a number of different levels, including their: 1. technical knowledge; 2. vendor relationships; 3. broad and specific knowledge of their student population; 4. intra and inter-agency coordination; and 5. relationship with their constituency.

1. Technical Knowledge: The Office of Pupil Transportation tracking system is designed to transport approximately 170,000 students out of the 1.1 million total, on a daily basis. The 170,000 are children in the lower grades and/or with special needs. On September 11, OPT either accommodated or coordinated the transport of every student in the entire system (a little under one million). The Mapping System revealed accurate and timely information. This example of crisis retrofitting SOP’s is wholly noteworthy.

2. Vendor Relationships: OPT has successfully interacted and worked with suppliers of transportation with whom they contracted, as evidenced by the rapidity and accuracy with which information was transmitted and alternate plans were put into place. They were even part of the “war-room” team that met throughout recovery and response.

3. Knowledge of their Population: Safe and adaptable transportation plans and the plan for handling the closing of schools must fit together, seamlessly. The decision to keep schools opened allowed for the necessary time (only about 2 hours, in the NYC example), to formulate the plan. The plan addressed the needs of the four types of students involved in closing, and again, normal protocol was shaped to meet their needs in catastrophe. The knowledge-base was already present and precise, and thus, integral to successful crisis-management.

4. Intra and Inter-agency Coordination: Professionals at BOE did their job as successfully because their connections, both formal and informal, with agencies such as the MTA, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which is the agency that runs the New York City public transportation system, were secure. Clearly, the ground-work of these relationships was accomplished during the normal interactions among the professionals. The handling of September 11 response and recovery, by OPT points to the importance of strong informal connections between and among agencies engaged in the transport of children throughout the system.
5. **RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR CONSTITUENCY:** Leadership of the OPT established from the outset that parents and children - entire families - were important to them. Outreach was the mantra. It was realized through: 1. setting up the process whereby parents, siblings and students could all ride on the buses, until comfort levels were achieved; 2. establishing of a hotline for parents to call; 3. updating of the BOE website with information on travel routes, on consistent bases; 4. conducting face-to-face meetings with parents in both large and small groups; and 5. remaining responsive to the impact of 9/11 on displaced families, on those who lost loved ones, and on the general disruptions that marked relocation and reopening of evacuated schools.
CHAPTER III - FACILITIES AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL

Schools became staging areas for rescue operations and emergency services. Schools would act as medical facilities, morgues, and shelters for rescue workers. Clean-up of schools closed concentrated on asbestos removal. Access was difficult because Ground Zero was a “crime scene” and sequestered as “frozen zone” by police and the military.

“September 12th was a very eerie day. It was the first day I was down at Ground Zero- at the High School of Leadership a block away. I was down there- escorted by the police- the first guy from the Board. It was extraordinarily eerie. A day I won’t forget. The windows of the school were blown out. Walking around in all that paper debris. That was the point where I was nervous for the first time… At one point, an alarm went off- and I ran out of the building and ceased my survey of it. I had to do damage assessment. The dust. There was a sacred nature to it. No one was around. The recovery hadn’t fully started yet. It was a ghost town. It was just shocking. I was down there everyday for three months.”

~ BOE Official

“I was constantly dealing with army personnel, captains and names and social security numbers every day. Sometimes it was quick sometimes it was not. Hundreds of thousands of people were converging. Getting news was tough from down there. Security changed so much. Tracking down the right people was hard.”

~ BOE Official

“The fireman (a custodian) in charge of machinery said that they had to shut off the ventilation system so we wouldn’t breathe in the dust.”

~BOE Principal

The story of Facilities and Support Personnel is mostly one of recovery rather than response, although, certainly part of the BOE’s actions on September 11 included response decisions. Recovery, on the other hand, considered the following: 1. the impacts of use by other public sector agencies in recovery operations at Ground Zero; 2. the clean-up of schools that incurred damage from the collapse of the Towers; 3. the costs of the clean-up within the framework of the guidelines of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 4. the multifaceted role of support personnel who worked in the facilities at Ground Zero as well as in the maintenance of school operations at the system-wide level. It would become apparent that costs of the terrorist attack exceeded those deemed eligible by FEMA.77 BOE officials would work closely with FEMA officials in the effort to bring reimbursement more in keeping with actual costs.78

RESPONSE
On 9/11, as has already been noted, eight schools near the World Trade Center were evacuated. The school buildings were either closed or they were quickly occupied by public officials conducting the immediate stages of response. The school buildings, themselves remained structurally sound, with mostly windows blown out.79 They were, however, compromised by the significant amount of airborne debris making a large part of the of clean-up environmentally based.80 While custodians had been instrumental in lessening the impact of the destruction on filters and airway systems when they turned off the ventilation, dust was still a critical problem.81 Engineers and custodians, in addition to their work for the BOE, also staffed buildings used in recovery to ensure structural wellbeing and engage in on-going maintenance.

It is well recognized, in disaster planning, that schools become resources which can be and are often tapped into for support in response and recovery functions. This was certainly the case for schools on 9/11.

This list below describes how the evacuated buildings were used. Enrollment numbers are included to indicate the scope of displacement.82

**PUBLIC SCHOOL 89**, District 2, 201 Warren Street, Enrollment: 362
- Students and personnel evacuated/school closed
- Facility used as a relief center for rescue worker

**INTERMEDIATE SCHOOL 89**, District 2, 201 Warren Street, Enrollment: 255
- Students and personnel evacuated/school closed
- Facility used as a relief center for rescue worker

**PUBLIC SCHOOL 234**, District 2, 292 Greenwich Street, Enrollment: 628
- Students and personnel evacuated/school closed

**PUBLIC SCHOOL 150**, District 2, 334 Greenwich Street, Enrollment: 161
- Students and personnel evacuated/school closed
STUYVESANT HIGH SCHOOL, 345 Chamber Street, Enrollment: 3,011
- Students and personnel evacuated/school closed
- Facility used as a relief center for rescue workers

HIGH SCHOOL OF LEADERSHIP AND PUBLIC SERVICE, 90 Trinity Place, Enrollment: 599
- Students and personnel evacuated/school closed
- Facility incurred damage due to World Trade Center collapse
- Facility used as a temporary morgue

HIGH SCHOOL OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCE, 100 Trinity Place, Enrollment: 730
- Facility and 730 students evacuated/school closed
- Facility incurred damage due to World Trade Center collapse
- Facility used as a temporary morgue

PUBLIC SCHOOL 721 M, 345 Chambers Street, Enrollment: 45
- Students and personnel evacuated/school closed
- Facility used as a relief center for rescue workers

MURRY BERGTRAUM HIGH SCHOOL, Police Plaza, Enrollment: 3,000
- Students and personnel evacuated
- School reopen in September

RECOVERY
In recovery, the BOE, focused on getting students back in the classroom, learning and reclaiming a sense of normalcy in a time of upheaval.

Displaced students had to be reassigned and thus, relocated to other schools around the city. The reassignment of schools became the responsibility of Burton Sacks. He and his staff identified adequate host schools, furnished additional desks and books, organized the schedule of classes, and sequenced the reopening of affected schools. He also coordinated all of these requirements with the departments of food services and transportation of students and staff to host schools. Gregory Thomas worked with Sacks in ensuring that children transported into unfamiliar neighborhoods were protected by plainclothes and uniformed police officers as well as by security officers within the schools themselves.83 (see Chapter I) All of the reassigned schools, totaling 5,791 students, began classes on Thursday, September 20, 2002, six school days after 9/11.84 Students in Murry Bergtraum High School were among the 9,000 students evacuated on September 11; however, they returned to school very soon after the event.
Much attention regarding schools relocation and reopening was focused on Stuyvesant High School, academically renowned in the City, as well as one of the largest on the list of schools impacted by 9/11 events. Stuyvesant High School became a staging area for recovery and relief efforts with as many as a 1,000 people using the facility at any given time of day. Because it was the farthest, geographically, from the Twin Towers, it was also designated by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani as the school to re-opened as the City sought a return to normalcy.

The process of relocation and reopening of schools was not without its controversy. In fact, most of the criticism the Board received with regard to its managing of 9/11 came from the challenge of the enormous clean-up of airborne particulates and determining how clean was clean, and how safe was the air to breathe.

The Board took very seriously the notion that the safest possible air quality would have to be proven for students to return to their schools. In fact, the Board engaged in testing that extended beyond what either insurance companies or FEMA indicated as necessary. As has been previously stated, the BOE also worked with the UFT and parent associations to get data from their independently contracted testing. (see Chapter I) The actual process of clean up and re-opening of all schools impacted by 9/11 occurred from October 2001 through to February 2002.

Stuyvesant High School reopened for classes on October 9, 2001. P.S. 150, 234, 89 and I.S. 89 all opened Monday, February 4, 2002. The High Schools of Economics and Finance and Leadership and Public Service opened in early February as well. No media was allowed access inside the schools because the BOE was committed to smooth transition on the first days of reopening and return to normalcy.

The BOE would realize a number of different characteristics of recovery as their facilities were used in capacities other than for education. For instance, Ground Zero was labeled a crime scene, patrolled and inspected by NYPD, FBI, and by the Military. Access to any facility within the area became allowable only by special permits. BOE officials initially had difficulty in getting to their buildings. Likewise, vendors (that is food and garbage removal) had to have proper identification. Garbage, its accumulation and its removal, became a significant cost and challenge to the BOE as relief workers from all agencies worked tirelessly at Ground Zero. Buildings had to have emergency generators, water, electricity, and phones in working order. Custodians were crucial to the maintenance of buildings. Some even slept in the schools to support rescue operations. Engineers would be needed to complete structural integrity reports.
Relationships with companies such as Verizon (phones), Departments of Sanitation and Environmental Protection as well as FEMA and the Office of Emergency Management were crucial.\textsuperscript{95} Vacant schoolyards would also be used - for debris from the site as well as for cars of the deceased left behind in garages near ground zero.\textsuperscript{96}

Finally, the recovery process highlighted the disconnect between the eligibility guidelines of reimbursement indicated by FEMA and the reality of costs incurred from a terrorist act of the scope of September 11. FEMA’s guidelines indicated that reimbursement was possible for activities including: 1. clean-up; 2. debris removal; 3. emergency response; and 4. restoration.\textsuperscript{97} Likewise, FEMA, also disbursed funds for hazards mitigation.\textsuperscript{98}

Due to the unique nature of the 9/11 event as a human-made disaster, FEMA challenged many costs deemed by the BOE to be limited to FEMA guidelines. For instance, the BOE incurred nearly $700,000\textsuperscript{99} in lost books during the evacuation. The Board submitted this cost for reimbursement under the guideline of restoration, and was denied.\textsuperscript{100} Likewise, in the effort of the hazards mitigation of airborne particulates, FEMA reimbursed only 5 percent of the costs, rather than the full 15 percent allowable under its regulations.\textsuperscript{101} As the bulk of clean-up was environmental, the impact to the Board was substantial. For instance, it was estimated that environmental clean-up costs of Stuyvesant was between $1.5 and 1.7 million, while the costs for the High Schools at 90 and 100 Trinity (Economics/Finance and Public Service) approached $3 million.\textsuperscript{102} On a total amount of $4.7 million, FEMA was prepared to only extend support equaling $235,000 in contrast with a possible $705,000, still well below the actual cost. BOE would find itself submitting appeals in a number of different reimbursement cases.\textsuperscript{103} (see Chapter VIII)

**ASSESSMENT**
Overall the “lesson” of facilities for a complex educational system facing a catastrophe revealed that there would be: 1. impacts of disaster on school facilities; 2. use of schools for community roles in response and recovery; 3. redeployment of staff to help in recovery as school buildings are used by government agencies; and 4. very high costs that were often outside the eligibility guidelines for reimbursement.

**1. IMPACTS ON SCHOOL FACILITIES:** Terrorism is designed to injure or kill people and destroy property. Fortunately, no school building was compromised structurally on 9/11. However, given this fact, school buildings had to be quickly recast as areas for staging recovery operations. They became temporary morgues and
shelters. Playgrounds stored the vehicles of those people who died in the Towers. Garbage and debris would accumulate as human and recovery activity occurred. And, it would have to be removed.

2. Use of Schools for Communities: Core to the community’s sense of recovery, is the return to school and the continuation of the education process. In NYC this would demand a rapid relocation of several thousand students to other schools around the City; expectations were that students would have to learn, and that staff and students would work together to absorb the upheaval. This was just a given. But it was a given with the backup of attention paid to the safety and security of unfamiliar neighborhoods and internal school environments. As with aspects of response, recovery involved teams of professionals working together for the best outcomes. Likewise, outreach to parents and community members as well as experts and consultants marked the planning and implementation of relocation.

3. Limitations on Movement and Access: Access to the geographic area impacted by terrorism will be limited. “Frozen zone” is defined as a crime scene where special identification is required. Such was the experience for BOE personnel who needed to be at Ground Zero to review the impacts of the attack on their schools and facilities. In particular, military and police are required to patrol the impacted area. This situation creates, at least early in recovery, limitations on the movement of BOE professionals. Future planning might include recognition of this requirement and provide for contingencies, from coordinating with the security ID issuers to being part of the first inter-agency teams to enter “Frozen Zone” sites.

4. Role of Support Staff: Custodians, in particular, played an important role in keeping the impacts of the destruction minimized when they shut down air ventilation systems. They also were tremendously helpful in the maintaining of school facilities as they were used by recovery workers and as they were cleaned for relocation and re-opening of schools. Their roles were, in a nutshell, ones of multitasking. Recognition of the importance of in depth knowledge of the building engineer staff is also crucial, and must be captured in any planning for future response.
CHAPTER IV - FOOD SERVICES

The Board of Education is only second to the U.S. Army in the number of meals served everyday. Thirty thousand prepared meals were readied for emergency workers within six hours of the attack. Y2K preparations and the storage of three days worth of food stored for unforeseen events were crucial in the Board’s ability to respond quickly and effectively during this time of crisis.

“Part of Y2K planning led to having a three-day supply of emergency food available at all times. We created a 3 day menu that was as shelf stable as possible- including tuna, peanut butter and jelly and beef ravioli. Almost every school has this- not just for emergencies but also for basic services. They also have a supply of frozen food to be used assuming there are no power outages. In preparation of Y2K, we thought about the need for schools to become a shelter. Red Cross identified other shelters, and we paired them with schools that could be used for food distribution.”

~ BOE Official

RESPONSE
On 9/11 the BOE responded by preparing 30,000 meals for rescue workers and emergency professionals, by 2 pm on that afternoon. Throughout the crisis, Food Services continued to deliver an enormous number of meals; this proved essential to ongoing operations at Ground Zero.104

Given that preparations for Y2K emergencies, were not required105 the terrorist attacks became the first example of Food Services’ successful administration of its established crisis management structure. For Y2K, emergency support schools, consisting of 25 to 30 schools per borough, are identified on an annual basis to provide food and other basic services in the case of an emergency. Three days worth of food was stored in preparation for unforeseen events.106 In addition, Y2K planning had established payroll mechanisms for the nearly 8,000 employees of Food Services.107 Shifts were established first at 12-hour intervals and then at 8 hour intervals, and re-assignment of food staff was a crucial element of smooth relocation process undertaken by the Board.108

On 9/11, BOE Food Services provided 30,000 meals to emergency workers within six hours of the attacks.109 Initially, the operation ran exceedingly well. Food Services was even able to provide “comfort” food, -- pastas and other carbohydrates—through a special order for emergency workers, firefighters and
BEYOND THE EARLY STAGE OF RESPONSE

Beyond the early stage of response, that is 72 hours later, Food Services was not wholly prepared for the duration of the emergency and maintaining the high level of support required. In addition, access to refrigerators and freezers became a problem for recovery workers in facilities taken over for recovery activities. Thus, locks were broken and some pantries were in general disarray, undermining information about the type, amount and safety of food.

RECOVERY

As more emergency personnel began to work in recovery, a new challenge arose in food services’ ability to manage the additional BOE workers were necessary to meet the demand. Similarly, there was little communication in determining who would staff the sites and how they would do so BOE officials noted that the confusion about staffing decisions arose about two days into recovery. By September 13, the need for food deliveries complicated matters since security was tight. Stephen O’Brien, took charge of “field activities” and was able to re-establish control through staffing patterns and successful acquisition of appropriate “Frozen Zone” personal identification.

Food safety was another concern. Given that a major food-poisoning outbreak occurred in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, the BOE was deeply concerned with the quality of the food. In addition, power was intermittent and the possibility of food spoilage became increasingly high. In spite of this, no outbreak of food poisoning occurred in New York City.

ASSESSMENT

“Lessons Learned” from Food Services can be found in: 1. The positive impact of Y2K in both logistics of staffing and the ability of the division and its staff to provide over 30,000 meals in a time of catastrophe; 2. the expanded knowledge base of the actual food requirements in recovery and response to an event such as September 11; 3. the importance of protection against food poisoning; 4. access to food storage. The reinforcement that education systems provide critical resources in terms of food during times of crisis.

1. EDUCATION SYSTEM PROVIDES A CRITICAL SERVICE OF FOOD DURING CRISIS: The Board’s capacity to feed so many people was vital in recovery from 9/11. School systems, as public sector entities, have large amounts of food and staff with the capability to provide mass feeding services. They are also at the front-line in any given geographic area hit by calamity. To be sure, the private vendors in the Ground Zero area provided food as recovery progressed, (e.g. Starbucks gave away thousands of cups of coffee, restaurants served meals, community based organizations did the same) however, in early hours/days of response and
recovery it was the BOE that had both the supplies and staff to meet the high demand created by 9/11. In all communities, whether rural or urban, small or large, schools will be present and can be counted on to fulfill this resource need. Contingency planning needs to recognize this ability to contribute such a resource in overall community emergency plan.

2. THE POSITIVE IMPACT OF Y2K: Because of planning developed around Y2K, food services personnel were able to effectively take action in both the preparation and provision of food as well as in the tracking of those working on food services. The preparation and provision of food was crucial in response and the very early stages of recovery.

Payroll systems actually provided the information base on who was available to work and where they were. Likewise, the system for getting checks to individuals on hourly wage was effective. The system may have implications for both fiscal and project management in crisis situations. For example, other divisions of the Board may share the requirement of knowing where people are, how to staff-up during crisis and how to account for and process the compensation for crisis management work. Disruption of salaries in time of attack can add to general level of misery and anxiety as well as broader economic impact, and if possible, should be avoided.

However, the BOE learned that chain of command and staffing became very challenging especially within the framework of providing personnel in “Frozen Zone” areas. This experience should alert emergency professionals to take these issues into account as they plan.

3. AN EXPANDED KNOWLEDGE BASE WITH REGARD TO FOOD: A unique comment by Mr. O’Brien had to do with the desire on the part of all those individuals at Ground Zero who worked in the tragic surroundings of 9/11. Clearly, this report is not intended to present insight into the chemistry of how human beings respond to “flight or fight” situations. Nonetheless, it is worth noting the type of food that was appealing to those who were engaged in the discovery and removal of bodies and in facing such overwhelming destruction. It is food of high carbohydrate content. Plans for food storage might be deliberate in their consideration of high carbohydrate foods for the initial response and recovery.

4. THE PROTECTIONS AGAINST FOOD POISONING: The experience of outbreaks of food poisoning during the recovery of the bombing of Oklahoma City was present in the minds of those responsible for the preparation and delivery of food, in New York City after 9/11. There were, in fact, no such similar events for New York City -
again a testament to the professionalism of the food services division and the attention to detail with which they conducted themselves. Power surges and interruptions will be common in the presence of wide-spread or intense destruction. Awareness of this constraint is important in determining type and amount of food supplies.

5. ACCESS TO FOOD STORAGE: Access to stores of food can be problematic in crisis situations. Mr. O’Brien actually identified some changes in SOP’s (standard operating procedures) that could help in the future. These included: 1. having sets of backup keys to storage areas; 2. empowering food staff to make decisions when the chain of command is not present; 3. creating a system of personal identification that would mesh, in a much more timely fashion, with the requirements of securing a “Frozen Zone” after an attack or calamity. This last point fits into the broader overall review of coordination of the BOE as an agency of response and recovery along with Fire and Police Departments, FBI and FEMA.
Despite severe technical disabilities, the BOE did a superb job in handling the content and validity of the information it absorbed about the events of September 11, as well as what it communicated back out to the public. The highest levels of professionalism were maintained, as the goal was to lessen miscommunication in crisis. As has been stated in this report and others, the technology of communication must be re-thought for catastrophic events. Appropriate levels (including “simple” devices) must be introduced into the tools of crisis management. Nonetheless, the BOE is an example of how well an organization managed its information on 9/11.

“It became a long-term effort to communicate and educate the parents.”
~ David Klasfeld, Deputy Chancellor, Administration

“As phones deteriorated, email held up. It took a day or two to come back. At that point, most everything was localized. Procedures were mostly meaningless.”
~ Anthony Shorris, Deputy Chancellor, Management

“The most significant difficulty was communicating with drivers and schools. We found out that parents came and got their children - after the fact.”
~ BOE Official

RESPONSE
This report has addressed issues of communication in two broad areas. The first is in the technological interruptions and failures. The second was in the efforts to keep communication flowing at the operations level between individuals, within schools and the Board, even in the absence of working technology. This “flow” was made possible by individuals taking ownership of what they knew needed to be communicated about “keeping children safe”. Examples of this include a principal traveling by foot to tell BOE that all children were safely evacuated; or, the pulling together of staff and information in the BOE “war-room” enabling Chancellor Levy’s attention to precise detail and direction in the three emails he issued on 9/11. Keeping children safe and getting them reunited with their families was the underlying message that drove all communication on 9/11. During recovery, communication had more components; nonetheless the same attention to concise, clear, accurate information was present.
This chapter further addresses two main considerations of communication during the crisis for the Board. These are, what was the communication into the Board from outside agencies and the public. Likewise, what was the communication from the Board to the public and outside agencies as well as to its own constituency. The content and validity of the information impacts decision making in any situation; in an attack, this information guides life and death decisions.

Communication into the Board on September 11 came from a variety of different sources during the actual attack on the World Trade Center. The Board staff watched the unfolding of the events on television and listened to the radio. In addition, information was available over the Internet. The Office of Public Affairs was a conduit of information from outside sources to the Chancellor’s Office as well as being one of the principle ways the public received information. The Head of the Public Information described the flow of information on 9/11:

Within 10 minutes of getting to the office, the Chancellor’s staff began to come together to begin to crisis manage. It was critical to this management to make certain that any announcements, any decisions were clearly and concisely communicated. Furthermore, in a time of chaos and fear, it was absolutely paramount that the messages coming through Public Affairs are consistent and accurately reflect the Chancellor’s decisions. Public Affairs was handling hundreds of calls from parents, press, and others and the very first decision that I made was that no one on my staff could give out information, without talking to me first.113

The BOE maintains both a website and radio station. Both of these conduits were used and proved effective in reaching the public with up-to-date information, when it became available.114 The New York press served as a secondary communications outlet for the Board of Education. One BOE official remarked that the press conducted itself with the highest degrees of integrity during the crisis response.115 Finally, BOE decision makers identified very early on the composition of the recipients of information, and it was inclusive: BOE staff at the centralized and decentralized levels (i.e. teachers, principals, the UFT.); the students and their parents, community and faith-based organizations, related government and private agencies, and the general public.

As has been noted, immediately after the attacks, the BOE was bombarded with thousands of phone calls, from concerned parents, individuals, and organizations
seeking to donate their services. A hotline set up with forty operators, handled approximately 7,300 calls on 9/11 itself.\textsuperscript{116} These calls were also answered with careful attention to detail and facts with the particular effort to ensure that only accurate information was passed along.\textsuperscript{117} The BOE would experience interruptions in service with every technological method of communication - phones, emails, computer websites. However, they would be able to continue to relay important information through television, newspapers, and radio. All avenues of communication were always sought when information needed to be disseminated to constituencies.

**RECOVERY**

The BOE’s Office of Community Partnerships was able to reach out to Community and Faith Based Organizations (hereafter, CBO’s and FBO’s) during and after the 9/11 crisis. The office identified CBO/FBO’s as playing a significant role in helping to manage and communicate the unfolding facts about the attack and its impact on the school system. On a regular basis the Office of Community Partnerships maintains contact with about fifty to sixty FBO’s, forty CBO’s and ten to fifteen After School Programs. The full cohort of community partnership organizations however amounts to about 8,000 throughout the City.\textsuperscript{118}

The structure of the relationships of CBO’s and FBO’s to the schools is that they represent networks within school districts, with advisory boards that work closely with the BOE policies and procedures affecting school children. CBO’s and FBO’s provide schools with both input from members of the community and a voice in the community from those whom the community trusts. The organizations, therefore, are very well versed in the nature and content of interactions at both the district and the central board level, capturing the decentralized nature of the system. They link the communities - families and children - to the educational system as no other entity.\textsuperscript{119}

Information to the districts and CBO/FBO’s was communicated in a broadcast email at 12:43 pm on 9/11, which highlighted the Chancellor’s decisions to keep schools open and his request for support in reuniting children with their families. Throughout the day, of course, no one was certain of the number of dead or missing. The CBO/FBO’s remained open well into the night, providing shelter for children and other people as well as working with the BOE to ensure that children remained in safety. The CBO/FBO’s would continue to work closely with the BOE throughout the recovery period, with particular focus on reporting back to the professionals on issues such as trauma, bias-related events, impact of the anthrax
scare and downing of the flight in the Far Rockaways. They were, in a sense, at a different frontline and wholly important to accurate accounting of recovery.  

The Board also worked with the CBO/FBO’s to sponsor local information sessions that focused on school safety and security, transportation, grief counseling, instructional strategies, and health concerns.

Finally, and perhaps, most significantly, Chancellor Levy was present at Mayor Giuliani’s daily briefings that took place after 9/11. This direct access to the Mayor and his cabinet allowed Levy to inform and be informed by the professionals who were engaged in recovery in the other functions/operations of New York City.

**ASSESSMENT**

The Lessons of Communication from the BOE are: 

1. **Validity and Timeliness of Information:** In chaos, clear, accurate, concise messages work best. A chain of command with a final point person who reviews information for this kind of content is quite effective in the management of communication during crisis. Teams should practice how this will happen when information is incomplete and disrupted. What type of message and at what intervals of timing are critical questions to be addressed and answered well before a disaster situation actually takes place.

   In addition, the validity of information promulgated from the Chancellor’s office was assured by Levy’s participation in Giuliani’s daily 9/11 briefings. This was particularly relevant in the efforts of “returning to normalcy” as signified in the re-opening of schools system-wide and at Ground Zero.

2. **Coordination of Sources of Information:** Communication in crisis situations will require coordinated efforts, particularly in the presence of malfunctioning technology. Radio and television may be the best resource in early stages, while partnerships with outside organizations can assist in the longer term acquisition of what the impacts are revealed. As with the issue of clear and accurate information, the relationships with outside organizations should be fully developed so that when disaster happens, individuals within and outside the BOE know who to contact. BOE and their partners ought to also define and practice
the pathways of information dissemination and plan for contingency if those pathways are disrupted.

3. TECHNOLOGICAL FAILURE: Technological failure is assured in events of the magnitude of 9/11. Therefore, vigilance with regard to have a scope of technologies available is important to future planning - from radio to websites to even public address systems within the schools. Technologies must also be prepared for failure of electrical power over large geographic areas. Individuals and teams may be designated to personally carry information to prepared centers for dissemination via individuals or groups of individuals. It is vitally important for all of us who seek an understanding of the impacts of 9/11 to remember that critical information was shared by individuals physically transporting their information - on foot - to the Central Administration of the BOE in Brooklyn. Disaster that is terrorism is designed to disrupt at a number of locations and affect different systems. The most fundamental sharing of information may, in some instances, be dependent upon people bringing messages in person, should forms of technology be wholly undermined or electricity outages be severe and widespread. All preparedness efforts need to incorporate this possibility in disaster planning.

In addition, it is key that no emergency communication system be designed on a single method of communication. There must be multiple means of communication with each mode further based in redundancy. Likewise, power for communications has to come from multiple sources in the form of power back-up generators and/or ability to operate from batteries, as example.
CHAPTER VI - MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES

In keeping with actions of other divisions, the decision makers handling the response and recovery around mental health reached out to experts, who formed The Partnership for the Recovery in New York City Schools. The impact of September 11 on the students in NYC is estimated to be very long term. Support materials were developed as well as a broadly constructed needs assessment, conducted. The U.S. Department of Education and FEMA provide funds for initial assessments.

“The magnitude of the impact on the system in human terms is the loss of family members to (about) 1600 students and 900 staff members. Huge numbers of parents lost their jobs as well...no one can accurately measure how long trauma will last or even when it will first appear...post traumatic syndrome is a genuine issue and can be triggered three or four years later with stimulators like police and fire sirens...”

~ BOE Official

RESPONSE
The attack of 9/11 occurred during regular school hours and caused immediate and severe psychological trauma\(^{121}\) for students and staff- particularly for those in the immediate area of the World Trade Center. During evacuation, children and staff saw people jumping from buildings,\(^{122}\) evaded falling debris, and witnessed the horror of the collapsing buildings. A *New York Times* editorial described it in this way:

> Many of the children were screaming for their parents who actually worked in the towers. As one teacher stepped into the street, a small child saw the burning bodies falling from the tower and cried out, “Look, teacher, the birds are on fire!

Children and staff suffered losses (approximately 1500) in their families.\(^{123}\) The Board of Education took immediate action to gather impact data on the numbers of schools and students affected by the disaster. This impact data was a crucial element in the Board’s requests for funding in response to the tragedy.\(^{124}\)

RECOVERY
Within a day of the disaster, the Board of Education provided its superintendents, principals, teachers, and staff with guidance on how to address the immediate needs of students. Specific recommendations and instructions were given on: 1.
how to explain the factual details of the disaster to children; 2. how to reassure children of their and their families’ safety; 3. how to connect children’s individual grief and feelings of loss with the grief and feelings of loss of their communities.\textsuperscript{125}

Resource guides were provided to both parents and teachers that referenced literature on how to deal with and recognize the effects of trauma on children. Feedback from teachers indicates that this information was very helpful in enabling them to respond to the disaster effectively in their classrooms. The Board of Education also sent out personal letters of condolence to every family in the school system that lost an immediate family member.\textsuperscript{126}

In collaboration with the Commissioner for the New York City Department of Mental Health, the Board of Education solicited assistance from the mental health community in New York City and from around the country. Students from schools in the immediate World Trade Center vicinity needed expanded mental health services that could not be provided by existing school-based mental health professionals. Likewise, children system-wide were experiencing trauma and loss and increased services were required to support these students. The initial program of mental health services, funded by FEMA’s 60-day grant\textsuperscript{127}, included: grief counseling, individual and group interventions, and the development of multi-disciplinary approaches to treatment by instructional and counseling staff within schools. Direct services to children and families were provided via a tier system: school-based services referred people to community-based organizations and to hospitals. The Board of Education provided school districts with approved lists of mental health providers at community based organizations from which students and their families could be referred for outside services. Many mental health professionals offered their services pro bono to children and their families.\textsuperscript{128} The teacher’s unions mostly dealt with the immediate needs of teachers and school staff. In addition, the U.S. Department of Education, under the Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, gave nearly 5 million to the New York City School System to support the efforts of mental health recovery.

The Board also recognized the stressors this type of disaster put on its own staff and therefore brought in professionals from New York University to do a debriefing session with Board of Education personnel. Debriefing sessions were an opportunity for people to talk about their specific experience of 9/11, in an effort to help them sort out their own feelings and issues surrounding the tragedy. In taking this action, the Board made sure that its own employees were able to respond to the immediate needs this crisis presented.
As in other areas of response and recovery, the BOE reached out to experts in the mental health field who had experience with the impact of violence on schools. The Children’s Health Alliance (CHMA), headed by Dr. Pam Cantor, is an advisory group who contracted with the BOE to coordinate mental health services through the Partnership for Recovery in New York City Schools. A mental health assessment comprised of a sample of 10,000 children from 100 schools. The results were not surprising. Large numbers of students exhibited symptoms consistent with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder -- major depression, general anxiety, agoraphobia, separation anxiety, and conduct disorder.

**ASSESSMENT**

The “lessons” of the BOE’s mental health response are similar to others that have been revealed in the actions the Board took on 9/11. These include: 1. engaging experts in the design and delivery of mental health services; 2. gathering data and information that accurately told the story of the trauma and mental health impacts; and, 3. ensuring quality control of volunteer response; 4. need to Address Staff Mental Health Concerns; 5. pre-planning for Mental Health Services; 6. importance of Family Centered Services.

1. **Engaging Experts for the Mental Health Response**: The BOE Student Services Team and the Chancellor set the tone for the mental health recovery plan from the very outset. They are to be commended. Their outreach to the mental health and trauma experts who had experience with both the Oklahoma City and the first World Trade Center bombings allowed for the managing of a situation which could have, naturally, been impacted by political and media pressures. The experts who comprised The Partnership for the Recovery in New York City Schools were also wholly engaged in the actual work of meeting the needs of children.

Likewise, the U.S. Department of Education through ProjectSERV provided extremely valuable funding, at very high levels of support, ($5 million) in the critical post 9/11 time period. FEMA also did its part in supporting the children and staff in the City schools. The role of these agencies and their staffs is highly commendable.

2. **Attention to Data and Information Gathering**: The team in mental health response and recovery knew that they needed greater insight into both the short and long-term needs presented by the destruction and loss of 9/11. A needs assessment provided the appropriate tools of scientific and psychological data gathering. The assessment not only identified immediate areas for concern, it also set the framework for analysis that will anticipate problems children might
encounter in the future. Finally, the assessment is an invaluable contribution to the knowledge base concerning the kinds of reactions human beings may experience in similar situations. A compilation of how the BOE is actually addressing the needs, modes of intervention and treatment, will also constitute a tremendous contribution to the knowledge on how to effectively support individuals who have been traumatized by events similar to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

3. **Ensuring Quality Control:** The experience of 9/11 volunteer response is twofold, many individuals will want to help, and that mechanisms for screening them is essential. Likewise, the tools of handling in the enormous number of calls include: phone hotlines and a very well informed group of individuals handling those hotlines.

4. **Provide Mental Health Services for Staff:** In addition to the services provided for students it is important to consider the needs of staff. As was done in the case of the NYC BOE crisis management and mental health services were made available to staff.

5. **Pre-planning for Mental Health Crisis Teams is Critical:** From the events of 9/11 and other events of violence which have occurred at our nation’s schools it has become clear that events may occur in school which will require mental health services that exceed those normally available in schools. It is important that schools preplan for these events by developing relationships with consultants, mental health professionals and organizations for referral to allow for the creation of a mental health crisis plan.

6. **Mental Health Services Provided Should Address the Needs of the Entire Family:** While providing services to the students is the traditional thinking, one must recognize the context of the child within the family. Planning for crisis mental health services needs to address the needs of the entire family in order to provide the support children will need.
CHAPTER VII - CURRICULUM

The Board of Education developed a two-phase strategy for implementation of the curriculum dealing with the events of September 11, 2001. The curriculum focused on understanding the event from a number of different perspectives including those of a political, social and economic framework. An anti-bias curriculum sought to expose students to critical thinking about what it was to remain a community wherein diversity and difference was respected.

“It is horrendous to think what could have happened in our schools and communities after the World Trade Center disaster, and for the most part, nothing did happen. There has never been a greater sense of community in New York City - and the schools are very much as reason why this has occurred.”

~ Bill Casey, Chief Executive, Division of Program Development & Dissemination

RESPONSE
The curricular response of the BOE involved the work of curriculum teams at the Board as well as groups of teachers at the district and school levels and was designed to provide teaching material and direction immediately after 9/11 - that is by the opening of the school on September 13th. Bill Casey headed up the team at the Board’s office of instruction. The team would identify sources of materials, pull them into a cohesive whole and then add pertinent information on the topic of the terrorist attack. The goal of the effort in response was to develop materials that would foster a deeper comprehension about the events of 9/11, in terms of grief and loss, as well as to ward off violence toward those who were Muslim or appeared to be Muslim. The second set of materials dealt with the socio-political realities of the United States finding itself in a “war on terrorism”.131

In response, curriculum was characterized as “first phase”. The first phase had three goals:

- To give advice to teachers on how to help students handle the grief and anger, while also presenting issues for discussion on terrorism and terrorists. An important objective, as had been stated, was to protect against or militate against any bias-attacks or blame directed at Arab-Americans. “Hate Hurts” curriculum of the Anti-Defamation League was used.
• To suggest ways to work with concepts of conflict resolution. Faith Based Organizations were consulted on this part of the curriculum not only to develop guidelines and content but also to ask them to monitor any bias related events.
• To establish a common set of definitions and language with which to develop a context of learning around the issues. The geography of Afghanistan and Pakistan was presented.

All the material developed for phase one was grade sensitive, Kindergarten through High School.  

The teachers and staff at the districts and schools accepted the responsibility of absorbing the curriculum and then communicating it out to their fellow professionals. While schools were officially closed on September 12, Chancellor Levy had requested that all personnel who could report to school do so.  

Because of this, Casey was determined to present the materials within 24 hours of the attack. The overarching themes in the curriculum sought to enhance understanding of the issues as well as foster a general sense of tolerance within the classroom and school environments, more broadly.  

Additional reading lists were periodically distributed. The response of the Office of Instruction working in tandem with the district and schools correlated with total absence of bias activity reported to the Board.  

The central office also sent out memos to all the teachers instructing them to monitor their personal behavior, as well as the students’ behavior, on issues of tolerance.  

Casey was well aware of the multicultural challenges presented by the terrorist attacks. Demonstrating the same measured, well-constructed thinking that had marked the responses of his colleagues at the Board, Casey reached out to a number of nonprofit agencies, community and faith based organizations to construct the curriculum.  

The American Red Cross, for instance, gave Casey insight on how children might respond in disaster situation and what teaching materials met that response. The Red Cross also donated an entire set of resources - one for each school - that presented experiential learning techniques.  

Likewise, Casey contacted both the Muslim and Jewish communities at both a secular and non-secular level to ensure an even-keeled rendering of the issues in the aftermath of the World Trade Center event. The strategy demanded a bit more time to create and disseminate curriculum, it nonetheless, incorporated expert advice making for a better product(s).
The collective intelligence on the impacts of disasters, both human-made and natural, does not reside in the marketplace. Bill Casey would note that his outreach to the private sector education for-profit organizations would yield no useful materials. This experience/insight impacts both the amount of and access to curriculum on the topic of terrorism and the pedagogical implications for education within the United States.

**RECOVERY**

After disseminating the facts of the World Trade Center attacks in the immediate hours (days) after 9/11 and providing a way for students to process the events both intellectually and emotionally, Casey and his team focused on subsequent stages of curriculum. These curriculum concentrated on the concepts of conflict management and resolution. The “language” of handling controversial issues at both an individual and group level was also presented. The curriculum continued to be grade and age sensitive and required that students “step outside themselves” to form a knowledge base that was both analytic and designed for problem solving. These features militated against the feeling of helplessness in the presence violence made even more unpredictable as terrorism. In retrospect, the terrorism may have actually allowed for the focusing of the curriculum and teaching in ways that had even more profound and lasting effect.

Goals of the curriculum, specifically, were to be:

- Effective in dealing with issues regarding the U.S./International response, the rhetoric regarding Osama Bin Laden, who was still a suspect of the bombing; the scapegoating of populations; concepts of war.
- Focused on sustaining openness of discussion. This was particularly evident with the High School curriculum. The material used editorials and letters from *The New York Times* in the effort to illustrate the broad range of reactions to the events. Everything from “let’s bomb them off the face of the earth” to “no violence is ever justified” was possible and necessary in the discussion. The use of the *New York Times* enhanced students’ interest in keeping well informed as events unfolded.

This curriculum took much longer to produce because it was vetted before an entire range of people both with the Board (those in charge of the social sciences curriculum worked on the documents) and outside. For instance, Arabic Culture groups reviewed the material. It was produced for October 11, 2001.
ASSESSMENT

The role of the BOE beyond its commitment to protect children, is to teach children. And, for 9/11 they clearly succeeded. The lesson of curriculum is three-fold: 1. Curriculum is a critically important component to the response and recovery from the educational process viewpoint; 2. curriculum development effort reflected reflects the unique nature of the schools in which they are taught; 3. curriculum provided a conduit to continue to support the learning community on the unique issues of tragedy and terrorism.

1. **Curriculum in Response and Recovery:** The BOE was able to support teachers and students by September 13, within a day of the 9/11 attacks (given that schools were closed on September 12) with curriculum that was both grade sensitive and topic sensitive. It allowed teachers to conduct their classes within familiar structure of lesson plans. Likewise, it offered as clear a presentation and analysis of what had occurred within the City and the rest of the United States, as was possible within a few short hours of the attacks. Although constructed deliberately to ward off incidents of bias, the curriculum also filled the void of confusion, anger and fear created by the events of 9/11 for schools, system wide, and arguably for the communities in which the students live. As has been noted, there are no reported acts of bias in the school system stemming from 9/11.

As the weeks progressed, and the system entered recovery, the additional two phases of curriculum supported the “return to normalcy”. The presentation of curriculum in next two phases, furthermore, was adapted for greater learning outcomes. The curriculum incorporated experiential learning techniques as well as those of research, reading, and teamwork for optimum cognitive impact. Again, curriculum played an important role within the classroom setting as each new facet of the events of 9/11 unfolded in the media, and news.

2. **Curriculum Reflecting Uniqueness:** In the New York City Schools, 120 different languages are spoken by the children attending schools and members of the households from which they come. At the time of 9/11 the professionals at the BOE had little to draw on, in terms of curriculum for grades K-12 on terrorism and certainly none on the events of 9/11. The professionals at the BOE acknowledged this diversity and in fact, drew upon it, as they developed curriculum based on the events of 9/11. Furthermore, they introduced topics such as conflict resolution using examples that were familiar to children within the classroom. The curricular “fit” was an appropriate aspect of curricular development. Lastly, professionals followed what they set out for the rest of the educational community by ensuring that the curriculum was vetted before different political groups and community based and faith based organizations. This was important.
for demonstrating a commitment to the processes the curriculum encouraged. On a pragmatic level, the sharing of and incorporating views of disparate (possibly) groups ensured that the learning environment would not be further disrupted by public/legal challenges to the curriculum.

All of these experiences can be adapted to other school systems as professionals within them considered curriculum to address terrorism.

3. **CURRICULUM PROVIDING A CONDUIT:** Because we live in a “new” era of terrorism, the ways in which we teach our children and the manner by which we conduct ourselves will continue to be an important issue. The professionals of the BOE followed a framework that allowed for the maximum exchange of thoughts, ideas, knowledge to continue to militate against fear and support a true atmosphere of learning. It can best be summed up in the words of (former) Deputy Chancellor Judith Rizzo in a memo to Superintendents, entitled: *Resources for Addressing Issues of Tragedy and Terrorism*. She wrote:

*Continue to provide an honest accounting of facts and relevant details, clarifying any misinformation or misunderstanding students may have about what happened. Honesty always helps to re-establish a feeling of security and trust.*

*Always build on what children already know and understand, and make judgments as to how much additional information to provide.*

*Let students know that it is okay to talk about unpleasant events, and be willing to answer questions and make them feel comfortable by reminding them that there are no “silly” questions.*

*Acknowledge their fears while simultaneously reassuring them. In the days and weeks ahead, there will be a need to provide continuous reassurances to our students.*
The Board of Education engaged in unlimited spending in the hours and days following the attacks. FEMA required an extraordinary level of documentation for reimbursement. Many costs associated with the events are not totally reimbursable. Our review shows that documentation of expenditures is crucial for reimbursement purposes.

“In hindsight it was such as different experience. There was nothing to base it on. We just went in and did stuff without thinking of the financial issue. It was really tough - FEMA rules and regulations. We wouldn’t have known them before but if something like this happens again, we’ve been through the process and we’ll be a lot better off. We need to share out knowledge.”

~ BOE Official

“I had to take FEMA around regarding reimbursement at the end of September beginning of October. Four or five times to lobby to get money. As time went on, we had great access. So we rotated people at OEM and Stuyvesant. I spent 50 percent of my time before then just getting people in. Getting trucks in to make repairs was hard. There were constant differing interests. Protecting and getting workers in was critical. Then there were weekly meetings at the Chancellor’s office.”

~ BOE Official

RESPONSE
The Board of Education’s financial situation was strained prior to the attacks on 9/11. The city and state 2001 budgets mandated that the Board make additional budget cuts and in August 2001, the Board cut $290 million without directly affecting classroom instruction. Thus, on 9/11 the Board was responding to the crisis with a limited budget.

Because the Board’s goal is to provide a safe environment for their children, the BOE initially responded to the crisis without regard to financial implications. The decision was made to “clean up now and worry about expenses later.” The expectation was that city, state and federal resources would reimburse most of the spending. This actually turned out not to be the case and the Board conducted negotiations with FEMA on what was reimbursable.145 The Board
immediately designated a point person from the budget office to work with FEMA and other agencies.146

RECOVERY
The primary goal of the clean-up period was to ensure the safety of students without interrupting classroom instruction. A new coding structure for World Trade Center related expenses was implemented immediately in order to track expenditures. Costs incurred included relocation expenses, transportation expenses, employee overtime, physical clean up, environmental clean up, and the purchase of walkie-talkies for schools. Costs also included those of curriculum development and implementation, and mental health services.

The Board is now dealing with the fiscal implications of decisions made initially to ensure student safety and a quick return to “normalcy”. For example, the Board leases the buildings where Public School 150, the High School of Economics and Finance and the High School of Leadership and Public Service are housed and they did not wait for the insurance companies to cover the costs of clean-up and inspections in these buildings. The Board incurred these additional costs in order to ensure that students could be returned to their school environment as quickly as possible.

In October, Board officials met with representatives from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to review the rules and regulations for reimbursement. FEMA requires a thorough documentation of costs and expenditures and was only mandated to cover what was in their handbook. Previously, FEMA responded to natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes and was not prepared to handle the magnitude of the disaster on 9/11. The Board of Education has been working with FEMA in regards to reimbursable expenses. FEMA is creating new protocols as a result of this national disaster.

Officials involved in the recovery from Oklahoma City bombing including Marleen Wong were helpful in preparing budget requests for mental health services. Initial funding promises for mental health initiatives came immediately after the attacks from FEMA ($1.3 million) through Project Liberty and from the U.S. Department of Education Project SERV funds ($5 million). (see Chapter VI) In December 2001, an allocation to school districts of the initial Project SERV and FEMA money was made. Continued funding for individual, community-based mental health services comes from FEMA’s Project Liberty.

Many of the Board’s additional costs, such as the purchasing of textbooks, computer hardware and supplies, personal expenses incurred by teachers for
school related communications, transportation costs, the loss of perishable food items and facility inspections, were deemed ineligible for reimbursement under FEMA’s current policies. The Board has applied for funding to cover their costs related to September 11, as well as additional reimbursement from FEMA for eligible claims, like teacher overtime pay, moving costs, some relocation costs, food delivery costs, clean-up costs, and environmental testing. The Board’s Office of Corporate Partnerships had also been accepting donations through its Fund for Public Schools - World Trade Center School Relief Fund and has received funding from individual donors and the private donors.

An additional problem of the Fiscal process with particular reference to catastrophe was that the BOE system wasn’t able to quickly and easily absorb the money directed to them by the U.S. Department of Education. Considering that fiscal standard operating procedures are designed to ensure proper checks and protocol, the situation is understandable. Nonetheless, all organizations in time of recovery from catastrophe need to assess their standard operating procedures to ensure the highest levels of flexibility so that money can flow, prudently and quickly, to those who need it most.

Through the process of negotiation, reimbursement requirements and protocol became clearer for FEMA, the U.S. DOE and the BOE. In this process two elements are highlighted: 1. Professionals in FEMA and at the BOE adopted an attitude of working through the financial challenges wrought by 9/11. Nonetheless, the bureaucratic structures and protocols required a flexibility that was not evident in the initial efforts around assessing costs and their reimbursements; and 2. enormous amounts of staff/professional time are required to work through the complexities of who would pay, how much and what would be covered; and 3. leadership throughout the entirety of the process is critical to effective fiscal management and negotiation.

This report returns to fiscal questions for the final chapter.

**ASSESSMENT**
The lessons of fiscal response and recovery are: 1. It is appropriate, when faced with catastrophe, to spend as requirements and needs dictate; 2. setting up specially designated accounts for spending supports tracking of how money was used, but not what priorities emerge by way of that use; and, 3. the eligibility requirements of agencies whose mission it is to reimburse in disaster (FEMA and others) do not always coincide with the reality of spending.
1. SPENDING AS NEEDS DICTATE IN CATASTROPHE: The Chief Financial Officer and her staff’s most important decision on 9/11 and throughout the crisis was to provide permission for spending on various needs concerning the students. This permission was given to allow the students to receive the services they needed to provide for their safety and well-being.

2. ESTABLISHING SPECIAL ACCOUNTS AND CODES: This action allowed for ease with tracking spending as well as the kind of back-up materials required by FEMA and other agencies. In addition it helps capture costs that might be overlooked in the effort to provide the broadest levels of support across different functional areas of the BOE. For instance, that instructional costs turned out to be a major “hit” to finances caused by 9/11 can be demonstrated.

The accounting system should also have the ability to track and assign donations. Lastly the system should be discussed ahead of time with local representatives from FEMA and local and state disaster relief organizations. In this way these systems will be constructed in a manner which will maximize the potential for reimbursement in accordance with the rules of these funders.

3. THE REALITIES OF AN ERA OF TERRORISM: The BOE, by its experience with 9/11 has a wealth of knowledge to share with local, state and government agencies about the realities and impact of catastrophic events for schools. FEMA, in particular, learned that it had to adapt its eligibility requirements to meet the need of schools as distinct in terroristic situations. On the other hand, the BOE discovered that the kind of fiscal flexibility required of it in times of terror is not fully present. This was particularly relevant in relation to the U.S. DOE and its efforts to give the BOE money for mental health services. Thus, the BOE’s experiences illustrates that it is imperative that relief agencies and organizations adapt their reimbursement guidelines to address the full needs of schools that arise from terrorism.

4. HIGH COSTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL BUREAUCRACY: From the experience of the 9/11 terrorist attack it may be assumed that costs will far outstrip their reimbursement. Likewise there is a difference in the vocabulary, definitions, and regulations between budget divisions. Clarity on what is eligible for reimbursement may be elusive, and may require discussion and negotiation and ultimately an appeal or series of appeals.
Our review stresses the importance of open communication between parents and schools as well as the need for parents to provide up-to-date contact information. Additionally parents need to be aware of their children’s school emergency evacuation plans in order to minimize parent panic during a crisis.

“A safety plan is not the plan for how you run the building; it’s a plan for how you prepare for and respond to emergencies. On the 11th, the eight schools evacuated all had each other as evacuation locations. We learned that backup locations are needed. Community involvement is critical to create concentric ‘safety circles’ around the schools. You don’t have to let safety stop at the school door.”
~ Gregory Thomas, Executive Director Student Safety and Prevention Services

Much of the role of safety in the response and recovery of 9/11 for the BOE has been covered in this report. Here, some highlights of Safety are presented within the context of this entire document.

RESPONSE
The New York City Board of Education has one of the most sophisticated and multi-dimensional safety plans to ensure the well being of its students and staff. All plans after approval from the Board are entered into a secure website for access by emergency response teams. All plans have listing of contact information, chain of command, detailed description of student population, physical layout of school, calendar of events, and daily school schedules. Careful yearly planning, and cooperation with other city agencies ensures the Board’s ability to create thorough safety and security plans. However, the events of 9/11 called for the processes of decision making on every level to both adhere to planned institutional procedure as well as allow for staff to make quick decisions in an atmosphere of chaos. Even with safety plans in place and evacuation procedures well understood, specific principals and staff made the important decisions to break from protocol and use their judgment to lead the students to safety and out of harms way. Further, though not fully understanding what the threat was or what future threats lay ahead, principals and staff of the Board took calculated risks that would prove to be the difference.148
The terrorist attack put the system under severe pressure. It was strained with efforts to ensure that the students and staff at Ground Zero were safe; at the same time it had to function to make certain that students throughout the 5 boroughs were equally secure. Students and staff would have to navigate through a city shaken and literally at a stand still due to interrupted train service, bridge and tunnel closing and a declared state of emergency. In the days that followed, the Board would also have to conduct itself under conditions of: lack of information, bomb scares, the threat of further terrorism, potential increases in incidence of crime and environmental hazards.

A New York City school-wide evacuation plan, in CD-Rom format, developed under the supervision of Burt Sacks and Gregory Thomas, is sent to the New York City Police Department. This plan has been established for 1,100 schools. Superintendents of each district also have access to the plan. The plan suggests evacuation routes as well as sites that schools can be evacuated to should this become necessary.

Of particular success were the orderly movement of students from the building and the steady and calm attitudes of all personnel within the schools themselves. Credit for this as has already been stated, is given the to the practice of fire drills required under the law and implemented at least twelve times annually.

The plan did not work in one capacity - that of the viability of the sites to which schools could be evacuated. This was precisely because those recipient sites were also involved in ground zero response activities.

Community Based Organizations also played a critical role in the safe return of children on 9/11. CBO’s engaged in afterschool programming remained open well after hours, providing safe and secure settings for children.

RECOVERY
In the days following 9/11 Board of Education officials continued to monitor the safety situation. When relocating, school security officers were also relocated to assist students in locating the schools and to be a presence to reduce any possible incidents that might occur.

ASSESSMENT
Safety in the New York City schools is a paramount objective of the BOE. As such, the dedication to it served the system very well in times of uncertainty and disaster, precisely because it is formulated on a decentralized basis and encourages “ownership” on the part of the Board Professionals within the schools.
themselves. This ownership facilitated the on-the-ground decision making that resulted in the wellbeing of students and personnel who were in harm’s way at Ground Zero. Important aspects of student safety involves: 1. Involve other relevant agencies in the development of safety plans 2. Redundancy is integral to safety planning 3. Safety Plans should allow for crisis leadership 4. Student Safety and Accountability 5. All Hazards Planning 6. Incident Command and Incident Management this can be assured.

1. **Involve Other Relevant Agencies in the Development of Safety Plans:** It is important that all relevant agencies including law enforcement, fire service, EMS, public health and emergency management at a minimum are both involved in the development of school safety plans and their evaluation.

2. **Redundancy is Integral to Safety Planning:** School safety plans should allow for multiple approaches to handle situations. This will allow for alternatives should an initial approach fail or become unavailable.

3. **Safety Plans Should Allow for Crisis Leadership:** In the end those at the scene must be empowered and trained to make independent decisions. Information and communication is often limited and those present will have to make independent decisions in times of crisis. Preplanning and training should allow for this.

4. **Student Safety and Accountability:** As the schools are responsible for the care and safety of the children entrusted to them, school safety plans must include the priorities of assuring student safety under all events and providing multiple methods of accounting for the whereabouts and status of all children during an event. This should be a repetitive process and include the process for release of students into the care of their parents and others in the absence of their parents including documentation and communication of these events.

5. **All Hazards Planning:** As history has shown time and time again one can never predict the variability of events which can occur. As such safety plans should take an all-hazards approach to allow adaptation and planning for any event which may occur.

6. **Incident Command and Incident Management:** It is important the school safety plans be able to interact with the plans of other agencies and the community wide plans. In order to facilitate this cross agency collaboration and connection common terminology and approach is imperative. By using the common principles of Incident Command Systems and Incident Management this can be assured.
“No one is ready for something like this...”
~ Harold O. Levy, Chancellor

With respect, perhaps it would be fair to question the Chancellor Levy’s conclusion. For the fact is that an enormously complex institution, charged first with the safety of its constituent members, in an unprecedented catastrophe, responded at an incredibly high level of performance. They did so through the utilization of intelligently crafted plans and systems; and where these were inadequate or unavailable, through courageous decisions and actions from the leadership and ground-level professionals.

The factual story assembled here reveals that the professionals in the echelons of New York City education were indeed ready to cope with the unimaginable and they did so without casualties and that the recovery of the educational system was conducted with speed and intelligence. This is a remarkable story, understated in its drama, because the professionals did what they were trained to do and supplemented their training with calm intelligence in handling the unforeseen.

The institutional culture, which universally spoke of “our kids” rather than “the kids”, is the first notable characteristic of the response on 9/11. It pervaded decisions throughout the day and well into recovery phase.

There are really two stories here: the immediate response to the crisis on 9/11, and the subsequent steps in the recovery of the system. In the latter category, recovery, one is struck with the immediacy of the corrective actions taken: Timely mental health guidance and propagation in the first hours, curriculum development within the first 24 hours, financial guidance intelligently ignoring crisis costs but capturing the extraordinary elements of the disaster within hours.

Prior planning and systems were crucial in the complexity of student reassignment and alternate transportation arrangements. Routine fire drills were credited with the maintenance of composure and speed of evacuation. Rehearsals and planning for Y2K were invaluable, especially in maintaining a feeding capability and food quality. OPT’s tracking system was crucial in supporting reassignments.
But, performance in the heat of battle is the most compelling story.

Evacuations were carried on with self-reliance and courage in the face of incomplete information and unknown consequences. Safety of “our kids” was paramount and the goal was achieved. The “stay open decision” was key and the subsequently stressed transportation system performed excellently, aided by competent management.

Facilities management moved immediately to preserve building access with timely attention paid to ventilation and food management, affording irreplaceable bases for police, fire, military, medical and volunteer personnel.

Nevertheless, perhaps the most compelling lesson is that in a crisis of this magnitude, it is inevitable that communications will fail in this sprawling a complex. Recommendations for triplicate facilities, enhanced media dependencies, and the like cannot totally correct for this exposure. The answer then, is that there must be an expectation of intelligent response on the ground by people who have been trained in what is expected of them. This is the key to future planning - the continued ultimate reliance on dedicated professionals.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The following is a list of 10 recommendations that emerge from the case study of the BOE. While these are not an all encompassing list of recommendations for emergency preparedness they are those which have emerged from the interviews conducted and this case study.

1. Review the Y2K protocol developed by schools. This review can provide insights into the emergency planning and reveal resources which exists and can be used for general emergency preparedness. The case of the Y2K planning for the New York City BOE involved many functional and operational areas that allowed BOE professionals to effectively respond to and recover from the event of 9/11. Information databases, payroll guidelines, and chain of command are all issues to review.

2. Communicate safety plans, with evacuation sites and plans for reunification, with parents and community groups. In this way, information is available in contingency, and, parent and community groups can be of assistance with these functions.

3. Plan for disaster food services by considering the number of days for the resupply of food. At a minimum this should be 3 days. Planning for disaster food services should also account for the role school food services
may play as mass feeding facilities for emergency personnel and the community.

4. Share with other emergency responders the complete safety plans and involve them in the planning process. The sharing of these plans should include all elements including items such as any information contained in the Tracking and Transportation System, food service planning, health care, facilities planning, communications, evacuation, student safety and accountability.

5. Consider at least three redundant systems of communication, incorporating both simple and sophisticated forms of technology. Coordinate these systems with that of the emergency response agencies to assure interoperability and ability to communicate with them.

6. Weave the function of schools becoming a locus of response and recovery in catastrophe into overall public sector planning for emergencies. This is important because schools have the resources of mass feedings and shelter facilities, for example, in times of disaster.

7. Acknowledge the important role of custodians and building engineers in evacuation, plan to work with contractors and vendors when developing contingency crisis management situations.

8. Consider that there will be unforeseen costs and that in an effort to provide for the needs of children these should be allowed. These costs can range from garbage removal to lost instruction time.

9. Ensure that a process of communicating with the media in times of catastrophe is in place well before an event. Provide for a single and approved source of information to prevent conflicting messages and confusion. Timely and accurate information is the cornerstone of proper public information in times of crisis.

10. Develop training and protocol for personnel at the centralized and decentralized levels that captures and reinforces the core lesson for the BOE of 9/11, critical decision and leadership skills are needed by those at the scene of the event and in charge of the school system. As was evident for the BOE, nothing substitutes for the on-the-ground decision making and critical leadership skills.
Post 9/11, questions remain about recovery in the schools as well as how the system would be able to react to any new catastrophe. 24 months after 9/11, this chapter serves as a testament to a community and its resiliency as found in the story of students, teachers and staff at a High School at Ground Zero. It also, however, offers a perspective that at least at the systems level, the lessons of 9/11 may not be fully absorbed, or even fully articulated. This perspective is at once, both a caution and a call to action. It suggests that we do not know enough, we have not shared our information enough, and we are not prepared enough to counter the threats of the day. We need to alter this situation.

“We didn’t get back to this building until five months later. The entire nation and city still felt the insecurity and fear. Fear is debilitating, destructive. Hope and a reason for living—that’s got to be your purpose. Sure we were afraid. Every time we heard a truck go over the metal plate or siren we’d get anxious. But we were already a tight community. A community of people with the same mission—what’s best for the kids. We already support and respect each other. We also understood each other and that we were all in the same place, we had experienced the same thing and gotten each other through.”

~ Ada Dolch, Principal, High School of Public Service

“Personally, for me, it’s got to be about the mission of keeping kids safe - always. The assumption that what’s good for adults is good for children, is not the assumption to make. Terrorism has the potential for such destruction. Schools may not be the direct target, nonetheless, they will be greatly impacted. If schools are the direct target, it could be tragedy beyond our ability to bear. We need to be better prepared... much better prepared than we are now.”

~ Gregory Thomas, Director, National Center for Disaster Preparedness

It is useful to able to look back at the events of 9/11 with an intention of learning what has happened, for both good and bad, since that Tuesday morning in New York City, 2001. The material in this chapter is based on the re-interviews of a Principal and the former Director of School Safety for the Board of Education.
Ada Dolch is the Principal, dedicated to her students and staff at the High School of Public Service at what is now Ground Zero. Gregory Thomas worked as the Director of Safety for the Board of Education on 9/11. In July 2003, he transitioned from the Department of Education of New York City to the National Center for Disaster Preparedness, the Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University. Mr. Thomas is now engaged in efforts at the local, state and national levels to encourage disaster preparedness for the most vulnerable populations, in particular, children.

The remainder of this chapter will present in greater detail the issues that are represented by each interviewee. Dolch and Thomas recounted the highlights of events over the past twenty-four months; and, each offers thoughts on what should be shared for purposes of developing knowledge. Ada Dolch has focused on recovery within a school community; while Gregory Thomas offers his thoughts on preparedness and the conditions that allow for optimum achievement therein.

This knowledge base integrated into schools and school systems across the nation will inform our preparation for and response to terrorism as well as to disaster of any other kind.

Ada Dolch is the Principal of the High School adjacent to the World Trade Center, now Ground Zero. She epitomized the decisiveness of decision makers on 9/11 who moved quickly to get children to safety on a day of massive destruction that by any estimation could have ended in causality. The first question to Principal Dolch was how did she decide to move so decisively and begin to evacuate her students even though safety protocol suggested otherwise:

*On that day, I drew from my experiences, growing up as a kid in the Lower East side. It was a tough neighborhood and I was always taught to be respectful...to walk away from the problem. On 9/11, I kept thinking if and when there is a problem, you go away from it. My intuition told me two things: One, I am not putting my kids in the basement and two, we’ve got to get out of here.*

Dolch described her approach to decision making as primarily based on: 1. moving all in her building away from danger and, 2. relying on her assessment of the situation at the scene rather than following protocol that did not fit the situation; 3. conducting herself with total focus - that is without any interruptions by phone - once her decision was made. Dolch was also aware of the possibility of other bomb explosions.
I saw from my window that there were literally things flying out of the Tower. I immediately thought that the debris could fall on our building and the resulting worse case scenario would be a fire. This building is 14 stories high and it has narrow halls and stairways. It would take time to evacuate so I thought the sooner we got started the safer it would be. I called HQ once and they questioned my decision to evacuate. But that was the last time I used the phone. I decided that I can’t spare the time to wait for decisions, I couldn’t afford the distraction. I stayed off of the phones so that I could stay focused on the task at hand. I stayed in contact with my staff and Security Agents via the walkie-talkies.

Dolch had also equipped her school with walkie-talkies over the years that she had been Principal. Setting aside approximately $900 from her budget, each budget cycle, Dolch afforded herself and staff the necessary means of communication in a vertical, multilevel building. Furthermore, all the walkie-talkies had the same channel as the NYPD walkie-talkies so that Dolch was as informed as police as events unfolded.

I have purchased two to three high quality, NYPD approved walkie-talkies, for the past 8 years. Each one costs $800-$900 and it comes out of my OTPS. But I order two or three a year, depending on our budget, so that we are prepared for anything. They are not cheap...they get the job done. There is one for every floor and my key staff -- Deans, School Aids, Guidance Counselors have them. When I can’t reach people via the intercom speaker, I use the walkie-talkie...We used them on 9/11.

Another of Dolch’s notable actions was the way that she actually conducted the evacuation. Because the school year had just started, Dolch was preparing to conduct her first fire drill. While her staff and teachers were practiced in evacuation, several new students had not experienced one - at least not in their new High School environment. Because of her thorough understanding of the building, as well as her awareness of the proximity of the High School of Economics and Finance, Dolch orchestrated the steady and orderly evacuation. People flowed out of opposite sides with immediate movement away from the edifices into the street at the front of the buildings, south to a safer area. Groups of students walked immediately to tip of Manhattan Island near the Hudson River, at Battery Park. Ten minutes after all the students and staff arrived in Battery Park, the First Tower collapsed. Not one person was hurt or injured.
Ada Dolch attributed her decision making skills to a number of different ingredients. The first was her characterization of the requirement to lead:

When you are the responsible one, you have to be proactive in decision making as opposed to reactive in decision making. You plan, review, practice and go back and fix the problems. And you do this over and over. I am ultimately responsible for the well being of my kids and my staff. I put everything else aside to ensure this. I want to always be in what Stephen Covey calls the second quadrant where things can be important but not urgent because I planned for it.

The second was the fundamental ability to establish a leadership style that set the tone for the organizational culture within her school. As has been evident with all the interviews conducted for this report, Dolch communicated the commitment to her students:

Keep kids safe and they will be able to learn. Every single member of my staff has to have the very same commitment. That’s how I operate before, during and after 9/11...

Dolch also pointed to training and education she received as a third element of her decision making. She cited the importance of her own mentoring as well as role-playing in a decision making required of a principal:

I went to the Principals’ Institute at Bank Street and I took a 6 month sabbatical to play the role of principal. I chose a school in Far Rockaway. It was at that school that I first saw a Principal use a walkie-talkie. The situation in the school was that a student had a gun on the premises. Access to the communication over the walkie-talkie was invaluable that day and was one of the reasons the Principal was able to act quickly and decisively.

A fourth element Dolch identified is staff preparedness, specific to individual responsibility in any time of crisis or threat. As with the overall readiness that is found through the practice of fire drills, Dolch and her staff have also worked together to know and understand how each individual staff member will take up a specific job, thereby achieving a coordinated effort. Dolch explained:
There is a secret statement in this school – which I will not share with you. However, periodically I ask my staff when I am in meetings – what do you do, what are your responsibilities if that secret statement comes over the walkie-talkie? I don’t ask them if they know that statement - I assume that they do. I want to know that they know what to do when I make the statement.

Dolch cautioned, however, that in her opinion, the safety plans are too cumbersome and lengthy. She believes that viable safety plans must be genuine tools of management within the schools. Currently, she would suspect that the plans are submitted and then not used because of their length. Dolch also believes that the current administration at the DOE is dedicated to the safety of school children, but believes that because of the retirement of key personnel involved in 9/11 as well as professional who transitioned to other jobs, the knowledge base is compromised:

_I believe we all want the same thing but the DOE is reactive rather than proactive much of the time. I believe that they want to keep kids safe, but they don’t know what it means. Everyone that was involved with 9/11 has left... You know, there is a reason why we have grandfathers and grandmothers. They have wisdom, experience, history and that we can trust. We can learn from them for difficult situations. When there are no “Grandmas and Grandpas” we just don’t have the same level of knowledge. A school safety plan means very little when push comes to shove. A forty page, safety plan sometimes faces the danger of being put on the “shelf” as opposed to being a useful and functional document. Safety plans need to be a third of what they are now...Everyone should know his/her job._

The High School of Public Service, comprised of a student body that is diverse ethnically, racially and socio-economically, was relocated after 9/11. The community of students and teachers did not return to their school building for nearly six months. Dolch had a unique insight on the recovery taking place within the community of a school. She pointed out that activities around public service reinforce the strength of the community, and that, at least in the instance of her High School healing came from activities of public service. Unlike in other schools, students in the High School of Public Service did not participate in counseling in any widespread manner. Dolch explained:
The counseling services were fantastic for those students who could use them...counseling is not wholly applicable to my kids...My kids are Black, Hispanic, Chinese - they don’t come from a culture of using counseling...

Dolch recounted the unique way in which the members of her school - teachers and children effectively coped with the trauma of 9/11. The community engaged with each other around collective activity designed to help others.

Some teachers were knitting and the students asked them to teach them how to knit. Forty kids started a club - girls and boys. The conversations started as everyone—30, 40, 50 kids at a time, teachers staff-- was knitting. We talked through the pain as we made blankets, shawls, baskets. We made them for people in homeless shelters, and nursing homes. Then we put it on the Website and people started to donate yarn and other materials, and we made more.

The purpose of doing something collectively as a community for the benefit of others fit well with the mission of the High School of Public Service. The process of learning by doing and civic engagement was actually familiar to the students because the curriculum incorporates such approaches in its pedagogy. However, within the context of 9/11, all of this had extra poignancy, extra significance.

I will say that my kids learned what leadership and public service are really all about. They learned that you heal best when you do something for someone else. My kids and my staff learned something profound. We learned that as a community when we help others we helped, we healed, ourselves.

Dolch pointed out that even as the community was healing within itself, her role as advocate within the school system would increase. Some of the eight schools at Ground Zero, most notably, Stuyvesant High school received more publicity than other schools. Parents were vocal and the media was focused as were groups and corporations wanted to donate money. Dolch commented that the issues like those of language and socio-economics rendered barriers for parent action at her school.

The parents of my kids want the best for their children... but in many instances they don’t know what they need to ask for... for many of
them, English is their second language...in the end advocacy for my school came because I focused on it, my staff focused on it.

As has already been noted, it would take the high school of Public Service nearly six months before it could return to its building at 9 Trinity Place. The school had been used as a morgue; because the fires at Ground Zero burned for 99 days making air quality unsafe, air and elevator shafts, stairwells, hallways, classrooms, and other assembly places had to be thoroughly cleaned before the students and teachers could return. Dolch noted:

I went around to the cleaning company - which was actually named KISS-- and said to them, “when I can kiss these walls and floors, then I know your job’s done…”

The support from the Board of Education during this time was intermittent as it worked to effect recovery for the all eight schools as well as returning the entire system to normalcy. Dolch, in retrospect would have welcomed more support from the Central offices and the publicity of the media, but indicated that Chancellor Harold Levy reached out wholeheartedly to support Dolch and the High school once he was fully apprised of needs there. Likewise, Gregory Thomas, then Director of School Safety was instrumental in inviting the New York Giants Football team members to spend a day with the students. In addition, donations of computers, a holiday party fund as well as money for general recovery were made to the high school. For all of these efforts and actions, Dolch expressed her appreciation.

In extraordinary times, having the attention of celebrities can really help morale - particularly in light all the celebrity focus after 9/11. My kids, like all kids, wanted to be a part of being recognized. And, of course, the gifts in computers and donations really helped. I am very thankful for all of the help.

On a final note, Ada Dolch is a woman who spoke of her own personal beliefs as being pivotal to her ability to respond as she did during the 9/11 attacks and afterward in the recovery stages. On 9/11, while Ada Dolch was engaged in the efforts to ensure that all students and teachers were safely evacuated, Dolch’s sister, Wendy, died in Tower One. Dolch was fully aware that her sister didn’t survive the attack because Wendy worked on the floors above the fire. When asked about her ability to handle her loss and remain effective in her professional capacity, Dolch explained...
It was the fourth day of school; I didn’t really know my kids yet. We evacuated. I wanted to get over to 110 Livingston to tell them at Central that everyone was OK. One little girl, a freshman came up to me and said, “I am so scared, Mrs. Dolch, I am so scared”. She grabbed my arm and didn’t let go. We held on to each other and we sang songs as we walked across the Brooklyn Bridge... She was my angel that day... She was a Muslim girl. How could I be angry? How could I hate?

In all of her actions, Dolch conducted herself as a leader whose primary responsibilities included the wellbeing of her students and staff. Her management style was based on her nuts and bolts of what it is to run a complex organization as well as a focus on contingency planning. Her decision making skills like her other colleagues at the Board of Education, were certainly informed by experience. However, her decisions on 9/11 were not informed by experience of catastrophe because 9/11 is without precedent. Instead, Dolch, mirroring the actions of other colleagues at the BOE, responded to the unprecedented nature of the World Trade Center attacks and stepped outside of protocol to ensure safety and wellbeing. Even in recovery, Dolch engaged with her community on the basis of who they were and what they needed as unique and specific. Where protocol was appropriate, Dolch made use of it. Where protocol fell short, Dolch worked with her colleagues to achieve the most effective outcomes for her students and staff. This discernment and flexibility go beyond what experience offers and are the cornerstone of her management style.155

Gregory Thomas has over twenty years of experience in law enforcement and safety. Prior to directing the BOE’s Office of Student Safety, Thomas was an assistant commissioner at the Fire Department of New York City. In July of 2003, Thomas became the Director of the Program for School Preparedness and Planning at The National Center for Disaster Preparedness (NCDP), Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University. Since 9/11 he has been asked by public safety and education officials to share his thoughts on how school systems need to think about school safety in an era of terrorism.

Thomas commends the actions of his colleagues in New York on 9/11 and has worked to both disseminate the knowledge gained from the 9/11 events, nationwide as well as engage professionals in discussion about the issues. Still, Thomas sees gaps in most school systems’ ability to respond to similar catastrophic events. For him, prevention and preparedness (the two p’s) allow for the highest degrees of successful response and recovery (the two r’s). As he states:
An intense focus on “P2R2” is what every system needs to address the threats we now face. We have to go after this with an attitude that terrorism will happen again. It is not the question of if anymore, but the questions of what the next event is going to be. By preparing for the “imaginable” we prepare for the “unimaginable”.

In this theme of preparing for the imaginable, Thomas points to a number of different areas that school systems and districts can develop right now.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deeper and more professional ties with emergency management officials.</th>
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<tr>
<td>The allocation of appropriate budgets to the departments within School systems responsible for safety. This needs to include a consideration of a moratorium on budget cuts for a 2-3 year period, so as to ensure the financial support for adequate training and re-tooling of the professionals as well as emerging staffing needs.</td>
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<td>The development of training materials tailored for groups such as: principals and assistant principals, teachers, staff and children. The materials for children, of course, would be age sensitive.</td>
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<td>The capture of information and sharing of knowledge on a coordinated basis by those individuals directly involved in 9/11 as well as in other school based disasters, like school shootings. Typically, information is shared within professional groups, but not across them and not on a consistent basis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The engagement of parents, community and civically based organizations in planning and preparedness with specific reference to their role in ensuring the safety and wellbeing of the school populations.</td>
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Gregory Thomas begins his assessment of the lessons learned from 9/11 by pointing to an action taken by the Board of Education in 1998. In 1998, Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Board of Education and the NYPD outlined the criteria by which the function of school security, including the recruitment, training and deployment of security staff was transferred from the Board of Education to the NYPD. Thomas, negotiated with the NYPD on the specifics of the MOU with particular reference to fine tuning specifics for a school environment. For instance, the finalized version of the MOU included the protocol for search and seizure within a school as well as what constituted an area of responsibility for school safety agents and police officers within the environs of the school. This specifically meant that safety agents would seek to maintain a safe environment for students both within the school building as well as within
the “line of sight” of the building where students might take their altercations/assaults. (Thomas is currently authoring a case study with guidelines on MOU’s between police and school systems for dissemination nationwide).

Thomas believes that the agreement which existed between the Board of Education and the NYPD was critical to the safe evacuation of students from Ground Zero. On 9/11, 80 school safety agents actually knew the Schools at Ground Zero - knew where they were and who was in them. The officers were immediately dispatched to the Schools and were able to provide support to the evacuating school populations. Perhaps even more importantly, these agents were able to make schools a priority when catastrophe makes for so many priorities to be considered. This was particularly evident in the relationship Thomas had developed and then counted on during the recovery period which started for Thomas on September 12, the very next morning after the attacks. Thomas was able to gain access to Ground Zero because of his relationship with the NYPD and began to report back to his colleagues at the Board of Education the extent of damage, and fortunately, the physical wellbeing of students, teachers and staff. In a time of great upheaval and misinformation, this kind of managerial reconnaissance is important to helping systems have a greater balance in reactive vs. proactive decision making.

The cost of catastrophe as terrorism is a huge one. The dollar value attributed to the loss of life, the impact on the human psyche as well as the loss of property and possessions and impact on commerce amounts to billions of dollars. With this in mind, Thomas cites the importance of appropriate financial support to the departments responsible for safety in schools. The budgetary considerations, in the post 9/11 era, have expanded from meeting the requirements of keeping students safe from school violence, something that has always been a part of the mission, to keeping kids safe in a chemical or biological terrorist attack. What this means is additional training and educating as well as staffing for the departments who are responsible for safety.

During tough fiscal times, agencies are often asked to reduce their operating budgets. Many of these reductions require that school districts look deeply within their budgets to come up with cuts to meet the established goals. When the cuts can’t be avoided, Thomas cautions that educational leaders take steps to avoid making them in the area of safety and security, because the cuts can have deleterious effects on the stability of the school environment. Thomas observes:
It is true that most times education as an agency is exempt from wholesale budget cuts. However, once the money is in the educational agency it is not true that security is exempt. This is the opposite of what should be happening. Staff needs to be re-trained on the specifics of disaster, for instance, what do you do with a bomb, what do you do with a sniper, what do you do with a chemical attack, what do you do with all three at once in different parts of the city?

For Thomas, the requirements of security demand much more financial support with out spectre of budget cutting. In fact, he believes that budgets should be enhanced or at least maintained for a 2-3 budget cycles. Since budgets are made on a yearly basis for the New York City Schools, this translates to a stable budget over the next three years. The cost for learning how to planning and prevent is far lower than the costs of not learning. In most municipalities, public safety agencies like fire and police are exempt from large budget cuts because of their importance to the vitality and stability of their town or city. With the move to integrate police services into the school environment, schools need to be mindful of their increased role to prevent incidents. This increased role translates into developing and maintaining programs from those designed to reduce student violence to those that prepare stakeholders for disaster or acts of terror.

Likewise, Thomas notes that the most schools are not fully aware of the impact of catastrophe on instruction. For the New York City Schools, $47 million was finally designated at the amount that was spent to help make up for lost instruction. This amount encompassed not only the time lost in instruction on 9/11, but also the weeks afterwards when processing of the attack would necessarily interrupt scheduled curriculum. Thomas also noted members of the House and Senate from New York State worked together to influence FEMA to expand the definition of eligibility to reimburse for lost instruction time. He recalls that this political influence eased the FEMA/BOE negotiation at a critical juncture. Thomas notes that other schools systems might be more effective in their planning by understanding how and when to engage political decision makers in policy management.

Schools, by virtue of their physical plant - their bricks and mortar -- will and should be used as the operations buildings in response and recovery. Thomas recounted that the U.S. Military, FBI, Firefighters, Police, FEMA, and other emergency/police personnel used the school buildings throughout response and recovery. School professionals need to understand that the costs here will be high and many costs will be unforeseen. For example, New York City school officials
discovered that school property like shovels, wheel chairs, first aid equipment had been used by personnel during rescue and recovery. These items, understandably, were not returned to school property and had to be replaced. Schools because they have food, generators, and equipment and large rooms and auditoriums will be used as morgues, shelters, staging areas, operations centers. All of these roles have a price tag.

Thomas recalls that his colleagues were astute in setting up a specific disaster account(s) for tracking costs associated with 9/11, noting that FEMA can audit, currently, for up to four years.

Thomas is also concerned with the organizational culture he feels is the norm in the most school systems. It is a culture of reaction, not prevention, reinforced by policing where the emphasis is on intervention.

Right now, our security approach...by nature and by design is that of crisis intervention. We need to figure out how to be more pro-active, strategic. The entire planning component of security for the school system needs to be based on prevention... This shift in organizational culture has to occur at the centralized and decentralized levels, everyone involved needs to shift in their thinking and in their actions. I am not saying that this will be easy or fast, I am saying that it is necessary....

In the post 9/11 period, Thomas would like to see much more information sharing on the potential threats and responses as well as the specialized training in readiness for those responsible for school safety. Thomas has observed that professional groups have been actively engaged in sharing information with each other, but not necessarily in a coordinated fashion across professional groups. For instance, personnel from the Office of Emergency Management or Police and Fire, may or may not consistently engage with education or school safety officials; it is similar with Police, Firefighters and school safety officials. This intermittent or nonexistent interaction becomes important when one considers the protection of children as a vulnerable population in disaster planning and preparedness. Thomas observes:

When emergency management or public safety officials come together to plan for large scale disaster or conduct tabletop exercises or drills, school officials are often not included. At the very least, the emergency management team is not informed by those personnel who deal with their own “little disasters” everyday.
In the worst case scenario, this unfortunate omission can result in serious injury or death for children who are exposed to the disaster. School officials can also be helpful in the disaster planning dialogue because schools become the locations of evacuation and response. The schools are self-sustaining entities that contain food, water, equipment and free standing methods of communication...

The last point of the lessons learned from 9/11 is the requirement for communication between and among the member of the school system as well as with parents. This group is comprised of the professionals from the office of school safety, but also very importantly, superintendents, principals, assistant principals, teachers and parents as well as where appropriate, the students themselves. One tool to begin to develop an information base to be shared in what Thomas has identified as a “registry of care”. This comprehensive data base would be put together by the schools within the communities, first and then woven into a larger data base for use by in the central school administration. Thomas cites the extraordinary work of his colleagues at the BOE during the response and recovery phases of 9/11 where thousands of volunteers were screened within a 24 hour period. (see Chapter I) An expansion of the experience on 9/11 would not only maintain a current database but it would also by design engage stakeholders of safety and security namely professionals within and outside the school system as well as parents and students.

When a large scale emergency or disaster strikes, the care that is provided to the staff and children must be well thought out and delivered quickly. In New York City, we learned that the numbers of people who will emerge to lend a hand after a disaster numbered in the thousands. It is extremely important that the persons chosen to provide care to children during a disaster are credentialed, experienced and sensitive to the needs of children. The time to determine one’s merit and ability to provide care is not during a disaster but well before a disaster happens. Pre-established “registries of care” can go along way to efficient and effective delivery of care...

Thomas, in his ability to look at the larger picture of readiness in school systems offers an insight on what professionals might do on a collective and holistic basis. Thomas also cites a recent study done by the NCDP and the Marist Institute for Public Opinion, wherein findings indicate that in general, the respondents have no confidence in government to protect them in a terrorist attack. Being able to engage in productive sharing of information as well as coordinating the best
thought processes on how to provide safety for school children by all the agencies involved would go along way in mitigating this fear.

This chapter on 9/11, twenty four months later is intended to provide insights not readily achievable in the more immediate aftermath of the World Trade Center attack. It is also intended to highlight the unique nature of response and recovery for schools inasmuch as that uniqueness requires specific planning and prevention for catastrophe.

The question becomes what can be learned from 9/11 and from the New York City School system given considerations of the budget, the school community, and the organizational framework? We have already learned that while experience is useful, it has only partial utility in unprecedented situations. The recounting of the story of 9/11 and the Board of Education tells of individuals who focused on the events and who in that focus dismissed protocol and thus, made the right decisions. Indeed had protocol been followed, outcomes would have been very, very different and possibly tragic for the schools.

What has emerged from this story are examples of how to deal with the unexpected with effective decision making. To aggregate information around the areas of school community and intra, inter-organizational structure can guide other school systems and professionals. Some of what follows may seem just like common sense. But, as the part of the title of this paper suggests, common sense is often uncommon -- and implementing the ideas presented here requires the same kind of dedication that was present on 9/11 in the minds and actions of the educational professionals.

The school as a community and the leadership required to support that community is captured in the role of a Principal as “captain of the ship.” This description is apt because of its comprehensive nature. Dolch’s effective dealing with catastrophe meant a lot of things were in place by virtue of her management:

1. **A leader who saw a situation, assessed it and engaged in on-the-ground decision making** for the purpose of maintaining the well being of all in her responsibility.
2. **A thorough knowledge of the physical layout** - including basement -- of the vertical building that housed the school that informed the evacuation plan and implementation
3. **Tools of communication** linked into police channels, as well as being appropriate for staying in contact when telephones and PA systems went...
down. The walkie-talkies also allowed for coverage and rapid assessment of the situation throughout the entire building.

4. A well informed and talented professional staff to implement evacuation.

5. Well developed evacuation plan that had been practiced; language and codes whose meaning is known only to the professionals in the school.

6. A disciplined group of students who knew how to follow directives and directions who supported each other in responding to the order to evacuate.

7. A leader who advocated on behalf of her community. This included the educational and psychological wellbeing of students and staff as well as the renovation of the physical plant—the building—which housed the school. Likewise, the leader reached out to those colleagues at both a policy and political level, as their decision making would have an impact on her community, both short and long term.

Gregory Thomas’ perspective suggests two significant themes for educational organizations: that educational leadership needs to pay attention to and be fully engaged using the budget as a tool to guide them in their planning about catastrophe: and that they must pay careful attention to their engagement with professional safety and security groups.

First, looking at the budget as a tool of understanding catastrophe offers overarching themes about catastrophe and schools.

| All catastrophe will have costs that require tracking; all catastrophe will present unforeseen costs. |
| Schools will take on a general public sector role in disaster and that role may be have short or long duration, or mixed, depending upon the size and scope of the disaster. |
| Actually educational processes will be impacted and interrupted, always. Recovery will include lost instruction make-up and the associated costs of programming. |
| Negotiation on what schools will pay for out of operating budgets and what federal, state and local agencies will cover is likely. Political intervention may be warranted. Problem-solving, however, will happen at the policy and management levels of organizations. Productive relationships rather than adversarial ones allow for expedient and effective decision making. |

Tracking from a budgetary point of view means account set-up and management. Establishing special accounts for disaster expenditures and teaching decision makers about how to use the accounts is crucial. The record keeping, assessment,
feedback, and auditing will continue for many months after a human made or natural disaster. FEMA can audit up to four years; therefore all those involved in financial/budgetary management - at the central administration, district and school levels - have to remain vigilant about accuracy.

As schools move back into their primary role of education, the cost of lost instruction becomes significant. Lost instruction extends well beyond the immediate event of catastrophe, depending upon the proximity. Should school systems choose to make up this lost instruction, formulas that measure actual time lost and the cost of it will have to be calculated. If feasible, schools should make up lost instruction in the same academic year, and make it mandatory. Engaging non-public schools in the lost instruction time programming benefits all school children and is part of the calculated costs. Avoiding weekends and vacation periods to implement instruction makeup, is encouraged.

Lastly, the financial negotiations required of school systems and decision makers in the aftermath of catastrophe are complex. This is due in part to the estimating of costs as well as the defining of categories of reimbursement that may or may not be different from those developed by the agencies who reimburse. Because of the nature of 9/11 and the work of the professionals of the New York City Schools, FEMA has a deeper understanding of the needs of educational recovery. Professionals would be wise to converse with each other well before possible catastrophe presents itself. Such professionals include: chancellors, superintendents, principals, from the schools as well policy makers and department heads from FEMA and the U.S. Department of Education and Homeland Security. Budget directors, deputy directors, auditors from both schools and the government agencies ought to be included in these groupings. Regularized contact would help develop the working relationships critical to effective response and recovery in disaster.

Thomas’ exposure to the effective interaction with the Police Department of New York occurs well before the catastrophe of 9/11. His approach to that relationship begins from the fundamental premise that children learn when they feel safe. A school culture of safety and prevention is critical to safe environment of learning. This approach requires a pro-active assessment, interpreting possible sources of violence and mitigating them before they can be activated. It is a different kind of thinking and requires different sets of questions to asked and to be answered:

<p>| What are the requirements of a relationship between police and schools? |
| What are the requirements of the central administrations of the PD and the Schools (Police |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Headquarters and the Chancellor/Director of Student Safety)</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How do these requirements fit with the schools? With principals, teachers and professional staff? With schedules, with curriculum delivery? With the size of population and the location of schools?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How do changes in school policy or policy system-wide ripple out to the PD? How is it communicated? How are unforeseen consequences considered?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How and when do we revisit the relationship between schools and PD? How is it monitored and changed, if needed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What does it mean to be an officer of the law within a school environment? How do police conduct themselves in a closed, contained environment with populations in close quarters?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How is decision making shared between the chief executive of school safety and the chief executive of the PD?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the considerations of the above questions in situations of terror or violence within and outside of a school, schools or school systems?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What mechanisms are in place to communicate the specifics to emergency management, law enforcement and security officials/professionals?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What mechanisms are in place to communicate the specifics to school professionals in other areas - like transportation and food services -- parents, caregivers, media?</td>
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In this new era, Thomas points to the need for professional within the education system to be fully engaged in the development of anti-terrorism planning and preparedness as well as response and recovery. This is particularly critical because the populations of individuals within schools systems are children and they are vulnerable in ways that are different from the adult populations. This work may take the form of contracting out services of student safety for the school systems as well as the development of relationships with professionals that cut across the spectrum of safety in general. Identification of what is needed is dependent upon the unique characteristics of schools systems. Thomas urges that what ever the size and scope of the system, that school officials begin to think about these questions - and others that emerge in consideration of the unique characteristics of their own schools - now. Likewise, he speaks to his colleagues within the professional safety community to embrace the notion of schools as unique in their safety requirements and as unique in their contribution to anti-terror preparedness and prevention. It is not just the idea that everyone needs to be at the table, it is actually the idea that everyone needs to build a whole new table.
1 http://www.newyorkmetro.com/news/articles/World Trade Center/1year/numbers.htm. 9/11 by the Numbers: Death, destruction, charity, salvation, war, money, real states, spouses, babies, and other September 11 statistics. 2,819 is the official figure as of 9/5/02.

2 Success in this instance refers to the evacuation response of the BOE at Ground Zero as well as the safe return of over 1 million school children to their families, and continued professional staff performance without physical injury on September 11 and 12, 2001. At the recovery stage, the measures of success are more process-oriented. As the process of recovery is managed success may be defined in many other ways.

3 Levy, Harold. Chancellor. Email, 9.11.01 (9:46 am) to all Superintendents, Assistant Superintendents and Principals. World Trade Center Explosions.

4 Proposal: 60 Day FEMA Grant. Board of Education of the City of New York, p.1. (No date)

5 Ibid.

6 Project Serve, 60 Day Budget for Schools, Students, and Staff Directly Affected by the World Trade Center Attack, 10/05/01.

7 Op.cit: 4

8 Interview: David Klasfeld, March 1, 2002.

9 Interview: BOE Official. It is not known, at the time of writing this report, how much of the $100 million has been designated to the Board of Education.


13 Ibid, p.:8

14 Ibid


16 Interview: Gregory Thomas, March 1, 2002.

17 Ibid.

18 Interview: Burt Sacks, Greg Thomas

19 Memorandum of Understanding Among the Board of Education of the City of New York, The Chancellor of the City School District of the City of New York and the City of New York On the Performance of the School Security Functions by the New York City Police Department for the Benefit of the City School District of the City of New York and Its Students and Staff. (No date)

20 Interview: BOE Principal.

21 Interview: BOE Principal.

22 Levy, Harold. Chancellor. Email, 9.11.01 (5:49 pm) to All Principals, All Deputy Superintendents, &All Superintendents & Chancellor’s Staff Meeting; ‘UFTpres@aol.com.: School Closing.Harold O.Levy.
Interview: Polack


Interview: Principal, IS 89. No date.

Ibid.

Interview: Ellen Foote, Principal, IS 89. No date. Ibid.

Interviews: Principals, BOE.

Interviews: BOE Official.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Interviews: BOE officials.

Levy, Harold. Chancellor. Email, 9.11.01 (5:49 pm) to All Principals, All Deputy Superintendents, &All Superintendents & Chancellor’s Staff Meeting; ‘UFTpres@aol.com.’: School Closing.

Interview. Harold O. Levy. April 5, 2002

Interview: Casey, (No Date).

Interview: Casey.

Interview: BOE Official.

Interview: BOE Official.


Interviews: BOE Official.

Interview: Levy.

Interviews: Sacks.

Interview: BOE Official.

Interviews: BOE Official.

Interview: BOE Official.

Interview: Thomas.

Interviews: Sacks, BOE officials.

Interview: BOE officials.

Discussion Notes: Workshop Team, Final Briefing: May 30, 2002

Interview: BOE officials.

Interview: Sacks, March 18, 2002.

Interview: BOE officials.

Interview: Sacks. The Environmental Protection Agency separated itself from the report issued by the Ombudsman, which he had held for nearly three weeks before he released it. Subsequently, the Board of Education had the option of suing the Ombudsman.

Interviews: Levy, Sacks.

Interview: BOE officials.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Levy: Ibid.

Ibid.

Interviews: Sacks, Levy, BOE officials.

Interviews: Sacks, BOE officials.

Interviews: Thomas, BOE officials.

Interviews: BOE officials.

Interview: Sacks.

Interview: BOE Official.

Interview: District Special Counsel

Interview: BOE Official.

Interviews: Sacks, BOE Official.

http://www.nycenet.edu/daa/2002reading/details3.asp?bds=102089. The BOE website was used to relay the changes in subway and bus routes throughout the recovery process.

Interview: Thomas.

Interview: BOE Official.

Ibid.

Interview: BOE officials.

Interviews: Ibid.

Interviews: BOE officials.

Interview: BOE Official.

Interview: Ibid.

Ibid. Interview: Sacks, BOE Official.

NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO THE ATTACK ON THE WORLD TRADE CENTER. October 29, 2001. DRAFT.

Interview: Thomas.

NB: On September 12, 2001, schools throughout New York City were closed.

Interviews: Sacks, BOE Official.

Interview: Sacks.

Interview: BOE Official.

Ibid.

Interview: BOE Official.

Ibid. Interview: BOE officials.

Interview: BOE Official.

Interview: BOE Official.

Interview: BOE Official.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Interview: BOE Official.

Ibid

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Interview: BOE Official.

Interviews: BOE officials.

Interview: BOE Official.

Interview: BOE Official.

Ibid: BOE officials.

Interview: BOE Official.

Ibid.

Interview: BOE Official.

Interview: BOE Official.

Ibid.

Interview: BOE Official.

Ibid.

Interviews: BOE officials.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Project Serve, 60 Day Budget for Schools, Students, and Staff Directly Affected by the World Trade Center Attack, 10/05/01

Interview: BOE Official.

Interview: BOE Official.

Ibid.

Op. Cit. Board of Education of the City of New York: Proposal: 60 Day FEMA Grant. (No Date)

Interview: BOE Official.

Ibid.
Interviews: Giordano, Klasfeld.  
Interview: Bill Casey.  
Grade Sensitive levels are: K to 2; 3 to 5; 6 to 8; and 9 to 12. Memorandum to All Superintendents, Judith Rizzo. October 11, 2001.  
Interview: Bill Casey. No Date.  
The BOE had taken a number of steps to ensure the rapid and proper reporting of bias-related incidents/activities precisely because it wanted to closely monitor and thereby, pre-empt an increase in violence.  
Interview: BOE Official.  
Ibid.  
Interviews: Casey.  
Ibid.  
Ibid.  
Curriculum on terrorism and internment of Japanese in WWII was used as core to historic discussions.  
Interview: Casey.  
Interview: BOE Official.  
Interview: BOE Official.  
Interview: Ibid.  
Interview: Gregory Thomas  
Interview: Burt Sacks.  
Interview: Thomas.  
The New York City School System also engaged with nonpublic schools in recovery efforts to ensure that all children in New York benefited by programming.  
As has been previously noted, schools within New York State are required by law to conduct nine fire drills within an academic year. Dolch commented that having a fire drill within the first 4-6 days of the new school year is just “good management practice.”  
Steven Covey. The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People: 152-156.  
Dolch talked about some of the “little” changes she has made since 9/11. A supply of water is kept in the school as well as flashlights. Dolch suggests that everyone buy a key chain flashlight and carry it with them at all times. Has also changed her on-the-job attire; she now wears only trousers and flat shoes - not skirts and high-heeled shoes.  
Ada Dolch characterized her leadership as “Captain of the ship”.

129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156
Interview Participants (Board of Education)

1. New York City Board of Education Chancellor
2. Deputy Chancellor for Operations
3. Deputy Chancellor for Instruction
4. Deputy Chancellor for Management & Policy
5. Chief Administrator, Board of Review
6. Director of Leasing, Division of School Facilities
7. Chief Executive, Division of Program Development & Dissemination
8. Chief Financial Officer
9. Director, Office of Auditor General
10. Director of Communication of Office of Public Policy
11. Principal
12. Administrator Office of School Food & Nutrition Services
13. Executive Director Division of Student Support Services
14. Director of Office of Charter Schools
15. District Superintendent
16. Associate Education Officer, Office of Business and Community Relations
17. Superintendent for Promotion Policy and Summer School
18. Attorney, District 2
19. Principal
20. Administrator, Office of Student School & Nutrition Services, (OSFNS) Manhattan Regional Coordinator
21. Director of Corporate Partnerships
22. Principal
23. Chief Executive Division of External Relations
24. Deputy Director, Division of Budget Operations and Review
25. Administrator, Office of Pupil Transportation
26. Deputy Director, Office of Community Partnerships
27. Research Assistant, Children’s Mental Health Alliance
28. Director of Operations and Support Services, Office of Corporate Partnerships
29. Director of Communication Office of Public Affairs
30. Executive Director, Office of Student Safety and Prevention Services
31. Deputy Superintendent, Special Education Initiatives, Office of School Programs and Support Services
32. Director of Office of Categorical Program Support
Board of Education Documents (External)

Letter
Chancellor Levy, Harold to Secretary of the U.S. Department of Education, Roderick Paige, October 9, 2001

Letter
Secretary Paige, Roderick of the U.S. Department of Education to every school superintendent/chancellor in the country, February 11, 2002

Board of Education Documents (internal)

Email
Chancellor Levy, Harold to Superintendents, Deputy Superintendents, and Principals, September 11, 2001, 9:46 AM

Email
Chancellor Levy, Harold to Superintendents, Deputy Superintendents, and Principals, September 11, 2001, 12:25 PM

Email
Chancellor Levy, Harold to Superintendents, Deputy Superintendents, and Principals, and UFT President Randi Weingarten, September 11, 2001, 5:49 PM

Memo
List of schools to be closed on September 14, 2001

Memo
New York City Board of Education Procurement Department to all vendors, September 20, 2001

Memo
Blum, Marjorie, Division of Budget Operations and Review to all Superintendents, November 6, 2001

Memo
Outlining emergency time/leave regulations concerning World Trade Center disaster
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Briefing
Emergency Response to the Attack on the World Trade Center, October 29, 2001

Grant Proposal
60 Days FEMA Grant Proposal from Board of Education to FEMA.

School Safety Plans (NYC)
P.S. 89
P.S. 234
P.S. 875
J.H.S. 999 (draft)
H.S. 425
H.S. 475
H.S. 489

Mental Health and Support Services

Memo
Dr. Vern Moore, Oklahoma City Public Schools Acting Superintendent to Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Service Margaret Bradford, June 16, 1995

Memo
Chief Executive Office of School Programs and Support Services to all central Staff, September 14, 2001

Memo
Rizzo, Judith, Deputy Chancellor for Instruction, to all Superintendents, September 24, 2001

Memo
Rizzo, Judith, Deputy Chancellor for Instruction, to all Superintendents, October 11, 2001

Strategy
Maintain a Safe and Supportive School Environment in Response to the World Trade Center Attack, October 22, 2001
Memo
Donahue, Beverly, Chief Financial Officer to Deputy Chancellor for Instruction Judith Rizzo, November 5, 2001

Memo
New York Immigration Coalition on coping with national tragedies

Outline
Crisis Team Roles

Memo
Dealing with Prejudice, Stereotyping and Scapegoating in the Aftermath of the September 11, 2001 Tragedy

Resource
Diversity, Respect and Grief

Media and Press Releases

Press Release
“Chancellor Harold O. Levy Will be on Hand to Greet Faculty & Students as Stuyvesant High School Re-Opens,” NYC’s Board of Education Web Site, October 8, 2001, No.61 http://www.nycboe.net/press/default.asp

Press Release

Press Release

Letter
Community Partners detailing information session, November 29, 2002
Agenda
Information Session

Other Reports/Resources

Report

Report

Report
Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness, McKinsey & Company, August 19, 2002